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REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION IN
WISCONSIN PROCEDURE: CIVIL
LITIGATION'S DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD
JEFERBY S. KINSLE-R*
Requests for admission are the most effective, but least utilized, form
of discovery.' Interrogatories, document production requests and depo-
sitions are routinely used in civil litigation, but as few as ten percent of
attorneys use requests for admission.2 Admissions have the potential to
simplify legal and factual issues, expedite civil litigation, and reduce costs
for clients, lawyers and taxpayers.3 Requests for admission have proven
to be an effective discovery device in many types of civil actions,4 and
nothing expedites discovery and brings the litigation to a head faster
than requests for admission.5 Despite such enormous potential, Wiscon-
sin trial lawyers have been extremely hesitant to use requests for admis-
sion, as evidenced by the number of reported decisions involving this
potent form of discovery.6
This Article contains a comprehensive survey designed to educate
practitioners, academicians, and students on the law of requests for ad-
mission in Wisconsin. The primary goal of this Article is to demonstrate
that requests for admission are double-edged swords. On the one hand,
they can be used by the requesting party to reduce the time and expense
of civil litigation and, in some cases, even to achieve outright victory. On
the other hand, the answering party faces virtual ruin if the requests are
• Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. LL.M. Candidate, Yale
Law School (1996); J.D. Valparaiso University School of Law (1989). Professor Kinsler is the
author of A Practical Guide to Wisconsin Evidence (1995), Wisconsin Rules of Evidence with
Objections (1995), and the forthcoming Wisconsin Discovery Practice (1996).
1. Christopher A. Kenney, Making Requests for Admissions Work, 38 TRIAL LAw. GuIDE
1, 1 (1994). This comparison, of course, includes only the major forms of discovery-interrog-
atories, oral depositions, document production requests and requests for admission. It does
not include physical and mental examinations or depositions upon written questions.
2. I&
3. Linda M. Atkinson & Mary S. White, Requests to Admit, 23 TRIAL 45, 45 (1987).
4. 4A JAmFs W. MooRE Er AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRACrICE 36.02 (2d ed. 1994).
5. Edna S. Epstein, Rule 36: In Praise of Requests to Admit, 7 Lrrm. 30, 30-31 (1981).
6. Since enactment in 1976, section 804.11 of the Wisconsin Statutes has been mentioned
in less than 40 decisions. Less than five of these decisions have been reported in the official
reporters; the others are reported only on computer research services, like LEXIS and
Westlaw.
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not responded to in a proper and timely fashion.7 Another goal of this
Article is to prove that although the dangers associated with requests for
admission are far greater than those of any other discovery device, it is a
form of discovery that should be praised, not disparaged.
This Article also has four secondary goals, which hopefully will be
achieved as a by-product of its primary goals: (1) a disclosure of the fact
that requests for admission are the most underutilized form of discovery;
(2) an explanation of why this discovery tool is used so infrequently in
civil litigation; (3) a demonstration of the enormous potential of requests
for admission in Wisconsin civil litigation; and (4) an illustration of the
hazards lawyers face if requests for admission are mishandled, including
exposure to sanctions, malpractice liability and, in some instances, pro-
fessional discipline.
To be used effectively, one must fully understand the substantive and
procedural nuances of requests for admission. Consequently, the first
part of this Article will examine the history and purposes of requests for
admission, the permissible scope of requests for admission, methods of
responding to requests for admission, and the effect of an admission.
This will include a discussion of the procedural aspects of filing and re-
sponding to requests for admission.
I. SECION 804.11
Section 804.11 of the Wisconsin Statutes governs the discovery proce-
dure known as requests for admission. s Briefly described, a request for
admission is a device by which a litigant may request that an adversary
admit, for the purposes of the pending action only, the truth of any mat-
ters relevant to the action, including statements of fact, opinions of fact,
the application of law to fact, or the genuineness of documents.' If the
answering party denies the request and the proposition is proved during
trial, and if the court in a post-trial hearing finds that the refusal was
improper, the costs of proof are imposed on the answering party.10
A. History
Section 804.11 is patterned on Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (FRCP). FRCP 36, in turn, was derived from several sources,
7. Kenney, supra note 1, at 17.
8. Wis. STAT. § 804.11 (1993-94).
9. Id. § 804.11(1)(a).
10. Ted Finman, The Request for Admissions in Federal Civil Procedure, 71 YALE LJ. 371,
372 (1962).
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including former Equity Rule 58,11 the English Rules Under the Adjudi-
cature Act,'2 and several state statutes.' 3 One of the state statutes from
which FRCP 36 was derived was former section 327.22 of the Wisconsin
Statutes, which was substantively identical to the current version of
FRCP 36.14
As originally enacted, FRCP 36 was much broader in scope than its
predecessors. Former Equity Rule 58 merely imposed liability for the
costs of proving documents about which requested admissions had been
withheld.' 5 FRCP 36, on the other hand, applied not only to documents
but to statements set forth in the requests.' 6 Requests for admission
were not limited to the genuineness of documents or the truth of facts
set forth in the documents but could require the admission or denial of
11. Former Equity Rule 58 provided:
By a demand served ten days before the trial, either party may call on the other to
admit in writing the execution or genuineness of any document, letter or other writing,
saving all just exceptions; and if such admission be not made within five days after such
service, the costs of proving the document, letter or writing shall be paid by the party
refusing or neglecting to make such admission, unless at the trial court shall find that
the refusal or neglect was reasonable.
BYRON F. BABnrrr, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE AND EQUITY RuLEs 294 (1925).
12. FED. R. CIrv. P. 36 advisory committee note (1937).
13. CHARL.s A. WuoiRT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2251, at 519 (2d ed. 1994).
14. Wis. STAT. § 327.22 (1935) provided:
(1) Any party to any action may, by notice in writing served upon a party or his attor-
ney not later that ten days before the trial, call upon such other party to admit or refuse
to admit in writing.
(a) The existence, due execution, correctness, validity, signing, sending or receiving of
any document, or
(b) The existence of any specific fact or facts material in the action and stated in the
notice.
(2) Such admission if made shall be taken as conclusive evidence against the party
making it, but only for that particular action and in favor of the party giving the notice;
it shall not be used against him in any other action or proceeding or on any other
occasion, and shall not be received in evidence in any other action or trial.
(3) If the party receiving such notice fails to comply therewith within five days after
such service the facts therein stated shall be taken to be admitted.
(4) In case of refusal to make such admission, the reasonable expense of proving any
fact or document mentioned in the notice and not so admitted shall be determined by
the court at the trial and taxed as costs in any event against the party so notified, unless
the court is satisfied the refusal was reasonable.
(5) The court may allow the party making any such admission to withdraw or amend it
upon such terms as may be just, and may, for good cause shown, relieve a party from
the consequences of a default.
15. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, § 2251, at 520-21.
16. Id. at 519.
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any relevant matters of fact set forth in the request.17 Despite the inclu-
sive language of the new FRCP 36, some courts still considered it limited
to document authentication. 18 In an effort to reemphasize its broad
scope, FRCP 36 was amended in 1946 to remove any uncertainty as to
whether a party could be called upon to admit statements of fact other
than those set forth in relevant documents.19 After the 1946 amend-
ment, it was clear that all relevant factual statements were subject to
requests for admission.
FRCP 36 was substantially overhauled again in 1970. Before that
year, courts had disagreed about the proper scope of requests for admis-
sion.20 Many courts had held that FRCP 36 was limited to admissions of
"facts." Requests seeking opinions or disputable matters were consid-
ered objectionable.' The 1970 amendment made clear that FRCP 36
encompassed both opinions and disputable matters. In addition, the
1970 amendment described the answering party's duty when a request
sought information unknown to the answering party, and also reempha-
sized the binding effect of admissions.22 Procedurally, the 1970 amend-
ment brought requests for admission into line with other federal
discovery provisions. 3
In 1976, Wisconsin adopted the language of FRCP 36.24 The new
statute, section 804.11,25 differed from the former rule in Wisconsin in
17. Id at 520.
18. See id.
19. FED. R. Civ. P. 36 advisory committee note (1946). The change confirmed an earlier
decision in which a party was permitted to request admission of facts not contained in relevant
documents. See Smyth v. Kaufman, 114 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1940).
20. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, § 2251, at 520.
21. Id. at 520-21.
22. Id.
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 36 advisory committee note (1970) [hereinafter 1970 Note]. FRCP 36
was amended again in 1987 to make its language gender-neutral. See FED. R. Civ. P. 36 advi-
sory committee note (1987). In 1993, FRCP 36 was again amended so as to conform to FRCP
26(f), which prevents a party from seeking formal discovery until after a meeting of the par-
ties. FED. R. Civ. P. 36 advisory committee note (1993).
24. Schmid v. Olsen, 111 Wis. 2d 228, 236, 330 N.W.2d 547, 551 (1983).
25. Section 804.11 of the Wisconsin Statutes provides, in pertinent part:
(1) REQUt= FOR ADMISSION. (a) A party may serve upon any other party a written
request for the admission, for purposes of the pending action only, of the truth of any
matters within the scope of [sec.] 804.01(2) set forth in the request that relate to state-
ments or opinions of fact or the application of law to fact, including the genuineness of
any documents described in the request. Copies of documents shall be served with the
request unless they have been or are otherwise furnished or made available for inspec-
tion and copying. The request may, without leave of court, be served upon the plaintiff
after commencement of the action and upon any other party with or after service of the
summons and complaint upon that party.
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three respects.26 First, section 804.11 expressly provides a procedure for
objection for the party served with the requests for admission. Second,
under section 804.11 the request need not be limited to facts, but may
seek, when appropriate, opinions of facts or the application of law to
fact. Third, section 804.11 is not limited to facts "material to the action"
but rather is tied into the broad relevancy rule of section 804.01(2).27
B. Federal Authority
Section 804.11 is based on FRCP 36. Since its enactment in 1976,
there have been less than forty Wisconsin decisions interpreting section
804.11. Consequently, Wisconsin courts have looked to federal case law
for guidance. Federal decisions construing procedural counterparts to
the Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure are persuasive authority, but are
not controlling.8 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has implicitly ap-
proved the use of federal case law to construe section 804.11.29 More-
(b) Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be separately set forth. The
matter is admitted unless, within 30 days after service of the request, or within such
shorter or longer time as the court may allow, the party to whom the request is directed
serves upon the party requesting the admission a written answer or objection addressed
to the matter, signed by the party or attorney, but, unless the court shortens the time, a
defendant shall not be required to serve answers or objections before the expiration of
45 days after service of the summons and complaint upon the defendant. If objection is
made, the reasons therefor shall be stated. The answer shall specifically deny the mat-
ter or set forth in detail the reasons why the answering party cannot truthfully admit or
deny the matter. A denial shall fairly meet the substance of the requested admission,
and when good faith requires that a party qualify an answer or deny only a part of the
matter of which an admission is requested, the party shall specify so much of it as is
true and qualify or deny the remainder. An answering party may not give lack of infor-
mation or knowledge as a reason for failure to admit or deny unless the party states
that he or she had made reasonable inquiry and that the information known or readily
obtainable by the party is insufficient to enable the party to admit or deny. A party
who considers that a matter of which an admission has been requested presents a genu-
ine issue for trial may not, on that ground alone, object to the request; the party may,
subject to [sec.] 804.12(3) deny the matter or set forth reasons why the party cannot
admit or deny it.
See Wis. STAT. §§ 804.11(1)(c), 804.11(2) (1993-94).
26. Wis. STAT. § 804.11 Judicial Council Committee notes (1974).
27. Wis. STAT. § 804.01(2) (1993-94), which is patterned on FRCP 26, provides:
Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter, the scope of discovery is as follows .... Parties may obtain discovery regard-
ing any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery
or to the claim or defense of any other party ....
28. Wilson v. Continental Ins. Co., 87 Wis. 2d 310, 316, 274 N.W.2d 679, 682 (1979).
29. Bank of 'Two Rivers v. Zimmer, 112 Wis. 2d 624, 630-31, 334 N.W.2d 230, 233 (1983);
see also ROBERT B. CoRRms & MARK M. LErrNER, WISCONSin DISCOVERY LAW AND PRAC-
TzcE § 5.1 (1994).
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over, the court of appeals has recognized the instructive value of federal
authority construing FRCP 36.30 Accordingly, after considering the Wis-
consin case law construing section 804.11, those seeking guidance on spe-
cific issues relating to requests for admission should consult federal cases
interpreting FRCP 36.
C. Utilization
Of all the major discovery devices-interrogatories, document pro-
duction requests, depositions and requests for admissions-requests for
admission are the least utilized.31 This is true despite the fact that re-
quests for admission have been praised by practitioners and academi-
cians alike.32 In cases where discovery is used,33 requests for admission
comprise only 5.6% of all discovery requests filed, compared to oral dep-
osition notices and interrogatories, which comprise 43.1% and 35.4%,
respectively, of all discovery requests.3 4 In the average case, 3.2 oral
deposition notices and 2.28 sets of interrogatories are served, while a set
of requests for admission is served in only one out of three cases.3 - Re-
quests for admission are perhaps the most underestimated and un-
derutilized trial preparation tool available to lawyers.3 6
The underutilization appears to stem from frustration experienced by
attorneys in obtaining meaningful responses to the requests they sub-
mit.3 7 According to a recent survey of trial lawyers:
The great majority of respondents to the questionnaire expressed
frustration in obtaining substantive concessions through the use
of requests for admission. Several stated that as to any important
matters, the request procedure degenerated into a semantic bat-
tle. As a result, most viewed the usefulness of the procedure
largely in the authentication of documents and in clearing away
evidentiary objections-such as objections to the foundation re-
30. Michael A.P. v. Soisrud, 178 Wis. 2d 137, 148, 502 N.W.2d 918, 922 (Ct. App. 1993),
review denied, 508 N.W.2d 422 (Wis. 1993).
31. Report on Practice Under Rule 36: Requests for Admission, 53 A.B. L. REv. 33, 33
(1988); David L. Shapiro, Some Problems of Discovery in an Adversary System, 63 MINN. L.
RaV. 1055, 1078 (1979).
32. Report on Practice Under Rule 36, supra note 31, at 33-34; see also Thomas W. Evans,
Admissions Practice, 62 ST. Join's L. REv. 475, 475 (1988).
33. PAUL R. CONNOLLY ET AL., JUDICIAL CoNTRoLs AND THE CiviL LITIGATIvE PRO-
cEss: DISCOVERY 30-31 (1978).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 32.
36. Kenney, supra note 1, at 1.
37. Report on Practice Under Rule 36, supra note 31, at 34.
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qirements for the business records exception to the hearsay
rule.38
The lack of use can also be traced to the general reluctance of courts to
grant sanctions and the difficulty for courts to deal effectively with the
denial of requests for admission prior to trial.39 Whatever the cause of
the underutilization, most lawyers agree that the active involvement of
the court at early stages of the litigation will solve many of the problems
associated with requests for admission. 40
Other commentators have suggested that the vagueness of FRCP 36
has led to the lack of use, and in some cases, the misuse of requests for
admission.41 Another reason suggested for its underuse derives from a
basic misconception by some lawyers that a request for admission is not
a genuine discovery procedure in that it presupposes that the litigant
using it already knows the facts or has the document and merely wishes
his or her opponent to concede their genuineness.42 Another commen-
tator, Professor David L. Shapiro of the Harvard Law School, believes
that "[i]f there is an explanation for the failure of litigants to make more
frequent use of this valuable device, perhaps it lies in the inconsistency
between a rule compelling an adversary to stipulate to certain proposi-
tions and some of the tenets of the adversary system."'43 Many lawyers
and parties simply believe a discovery device premised on receiving
straightforward, truthful, yes-or-no answers from an adversary is
doomed to failure."4
The author of this article, on the other hand, posits that the most
likely reason lawyers shy away from using requests for admission is the
lack of understanding of this potent discovery device in the legal com-
munity. The goal of this article is to provide the knowledge necessary
for Wisconsin lawyers to make effective use of requests for admission.
38. Id. at 42.
39. Id. According to a survey of New York attorneys, most found that the procedure for
obtaining sanctions was not cost-efficient. Id.
40. See id. at 43.
41. See Helen H. Cutner, Discovery-Civil Litigation's Fading Light: A Lawyer Looks at
the Federal Discovery Rules After Forty Years of Use, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 933, 981 (1979).
42. Report on Practice Under Rule 36, supra note 31, at 35.
43. Shapiro, supra note 31, at 1079.
44. ROGER S. HAYnocK nT Ai-, FuD AmENTALs OF PRETRLAL LITGATION § 9.1, at 425
(3d ed. 1994).
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II. PURPOSE OF REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION
Requests for admission are one of several forms of written discovery
available to Wisconsin trial lawyers. Unlike other discovery devices, re-
quests for admission are not designed to discover facts. Because of the
form in which requests for admission are submitted, it is assumed that
the requesting party knows the facts before asking an adverse party to
admit that the statement is true. Requests for admission ask the answer-
ing party to "admit that so-and-so" is true. Consequently, admissions
are not designed, for example, to discover the names of potential wit-
nesses, as one cannot ask an adversary to admit that some particular
person was a witness until that person's name is known to the requesting
party.45
Requests for admission serve two vital purposes. Admissions are
sought, first, to facilitate proof with respect to issues that cannot be elim-
inated from the case, and secondly, to narrow the issues by eliminating
those that can be.46 Thus, requests for admission can be used to define
the issues involved in the case and to resolve some or all of the conflicts
prior to trial:
[A]dmissions promote both efficiency and economy in resolving
disputes. If a point is conceded, litigants need not expend effort
in investigations concerning it nor incur expense in presenting ev-
idence to prove it. Judicial administration is also aided. Admis-
sions reduce the time required to try a case. Indeed, they often
make summary judgment possible. Finally, admissions encourage
litigants to evaluate realistically the hazards of trial and thus tend
to promote settlements.47
Requests for admission define and limit the controversy between parties
to a lawsuit, freeing the court and the parties to concentrate on matters
at the heart of the dispute.48 In some cases, admissions may dispose of
the entire case.49
45. Atkinson & White, supra note 3, at 45.
46. 1970 Note, supra note 23.
47. Finman, supra note 10, at 376. According to Professor Finman, discovery serves three
functions: defining the controversy; resolving some or all of the conflicts before trial; and
uncovering factual material for use in preparing for trial. Requests for admission can assist in
the first two functions, but not the last onte, because requests, by their very nature, are not
designed to uncover facts. Id. at 373.
48. JAY E. GRENGo & WALTER L. HARVEY, 3 WISCONSIN PRAcTICE § 411.1, at 565 (2d
ed. 1994).
49. Id.
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No suit can be tried without some definition of its factual and legal
boundaries. A definition of the controversy is essential.50 Admissions
facilitate the defining of a controversy by eliminating issues from the
case that are not in controversy and by narrowing those issues that are in
controversy. For example, although the parties may disagree about the
meaning of a document, requests can be used to establish a foundation
for the document to be admitted at trial.51 Admissions enable a party to
pin an adversary to a certain position. 52
A controversy should be limited as well as defined.53 Contentions not
subject to good faith dispute should be resolved through concession
rather than by submission to a judge or jury.54 When a contention can-
not be honestly and reasonably disputed, the adversarial approach de-
lays and even endangers a just resolution of the issues.55 Limiting the
controversy promotes efficiency and economy in civil litigation, resulting
in lower costs for clients and lawyers.
Considering the issue-foreclosing nature of requests for admission,
they can also play. a vital role in settlement:
Unlike other forms of evidence which you may rely on in discuss-
ing settlement, an admission cannot be the subject of disputed
veracity or credibility. You may tell opposing counsel during a
settlement negotiation that the evidence you have obtained by
way of interrogatory answers, deposition testimony, or witness
statements clearly supports you on a particular issue vital to the
case. You can expect that the opposing counsel will dispute your
characterization of the evidence, and the negotiation value of the
evidence you cite will be minimized. Where, however, the evi-
dence you rely upon to support your position in a settlement ne-
gotiation is an admission to a request to admit, opposing counsel
is unable to assail the truth, veracity or credibility of the evidence.
The admission is indisputable, and your adversary knows that.
Therefore, you can use admissions on vital issues effectively dur-
ing settlement negotiations in an attempt to resolve a dispute
quickly and in your client's best interests.56
50. Finman, supra note 10, at 375.
51. Comus & LEnNER, supra note 29, § 5.3.
52. Id.
53. Finman, supra note 10, at 376.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. LARRY S. KAPLAN, COMPLEX FEDERAL LITIGATION § 17.23, at 389-90 (1993).
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Strategically, the requesting party's attorney must decide whether a par-
ticular admission justifies the initiation of settlement discussions. 57 If the
requesting party decides to pursue settlement, the admissions will give
him or her the upper-hand in negotiations. The requesting party should
be sensitive to the point in time in the litigation process at which to
broach settlement. The answering party may be the most vulnerable to
settling the case in a way that maximizes the requesting party's interests
soon after the answering party has been forced to admit a vital fact.58
The longer the requesting party waits, the less impact the admission may
have.
A. Discovery or Pleadings?
It has been suggested that requests for admission are not true discov-
ery procedures. 59 The rationale for this position is that the party seeking
the admission already knows the facts or has the documents and merely
seeks an admission that will establish the facts or authenticate the docu-
ments.6 ° It has been argued that requests for admission should be called
"requests for stipulations," since the term admission suggests that evi-
dence is being sought by the device.61 The misconception regarding the
role of admissions is due to the fact that requests for admission, histori-
cally, were limited only to document authentication, and could not be
used for traditional discovery purposes. FRCP 36 was amended in 1946,
and again in 1970, to clarify that requests could be used to obtain admis-
sions on any fact relevant to the litigation, not just facts contained in
documents.
One commentator has placed part of the blame for the continuation
of this misconception on West Publishing Company.62 In an effort to
illustrate the broad scope of FRCP 36, its title was changed in 1970 from
"Admission of Facts and of Genuineness of Documents" to "Requests
for Admission." Despite the name change, West Publishing continued to
use the old title for FRCP 36 until 1980.63 This misnomer, in part, pro-
longed the confusion over whether admissions are a discovery device. 64
57. Id. at 390.
58. Id
59. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, § 2253, at 524; see also Schmid v. Olsen, 111 Wis.
2d 228, 240 n.1, 330 N.W.2d 547, 553 n.1 (1983) (Steinmetz, J., dissenting).
60. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, § 2253.
61. 1 SHEPARD'S DIscOVERY PROCEEDINGS IN FEDERAL COURT 499 (2d ed. 1991).
62. Evans, supra note 32, at 478.
63. Id.
64. See id.
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There seems little doubt that admissions are part of the discovery
process. Not only is section 804.11 contained in the "Depositions and
Discovery" section of the Wisconsin Statutes,65 but most commentators
now agree that admissions are true discovery devices.66 Discovery
serves three purposes: (1) defining the controversy; (2) resolving some
or all of the conflicts before trial; and (3) uncovering factual material for
use in preparing for trial. While admissions are not suited to serve the
third function, they are perfectly designed to further the first and second
functions of discovery.67 Those commentators who consider admissions
outside the realm of discovery view discovery practice too narrowly.
B. Practical Use of Admissions
As one commentator aptly stated, "requests for admission should be
used early, often and precisely."'  Requests for admission have been
used in all types of civil litigation in Wisconsin, ranging from forfeiture
actions69 to prisoner's rights litigation.7" Skillful application of requests
for admission to all phases of case preparation and trial focuses the evi-
dence on the pertinent issues.7
1. Procedure
Requests for admission may be served on any other party without
leave of the court.72 Requests can be served at anytime after the com-
mencement of the litigation. Ordinarily, responses to requests for ad-
mission must be served within thirty days after service of the requests.73
The thirty-day period begins to run when the requesting party mails the
requests.74 If the requesting party submits a properly executed affidavit
65. But see Hurt v. Coyne Cylinder Co., 124 F.R.D. 614,615 (W.D. Tenn. 1989) (fact that
Rule 36 is contained in discovery section of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not, by
itself, establish that a request for admission is a discovery device).
66. See, e.g., CoRnis & LErrNER, supra note 29, § 5.1; Evans, supra note 32, at 478-79.
67. Finman, supra note 10, at 373.
68. Atkinson & White, supra note 3, at 54.
69. See State v. Gaynor, No. 83-283, (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 1983) (LEXIS, States library,
Wisc file) (limited precedent opinion).
70. See Richards v. Kolb, No. 88-0344, 1988 Wisc. App. LEXIS 851, at *1-2 (Ct. App.
Sept. 29, 1988) (limited precedent opinion).
71. See id. at *1-6.
72. A copy of the request should be served on all other parties to the action. GRENIG &
HARvEY, supra note 48, § 411.2, at 566.
73. Wis. STAT. § 804.11(1)(b) (1993-94). Unless the court orders otherwise, the original
copy of the requests for admission should be kept by the requesting party. Wis. STAT.
§ 804.01(6) (1993-94).
74. E.E.O.C. v. Jordan Graphics, Inc., 135 F.RD. 126, 127-28 (W.D.N.C. 1991).
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or certificate of service demonstrating that the requests were properly
served, the burden of proving improper service shifts to the answering
party. Denying receipt, alone, is insufficient to overcome the presump-
tion of service.
There are two exceptions to the thirty-day rule. First, if requests for
admission are served with the summons and complaint, the defendant is
given forty five days to respond.76 Second, the trial court has discretion
to shorten or lengthen the response time in the interests of justice.77 On
the other end of the spectrum, requests for admission may not be served
after the discovery cut-off date, though there is some contrary
authority.78
Many jurisdictions limit the number of interrogatories a party may
serve on an adversary.79 No similar limits are placed on requests for
admission. While courts have inherent discretion to limit the number of
requests, they have approved requests containing 704 admissions,80 244
admissions,81 and 106 admissions,ar but one court recently struck a re-
quest containing more than 2000 admissions.83 One method of preempt-
ing a claim that the requests are so numerous as to be burdensome is to
divide the requests into smaller sets and serve these sets in reasonably
timed waves.84
75. Unger v. Basterash, No. 89-1055,1990 Wisc. App. LEXIS 312, at *2 (Ct. App. Apr. 10,
1990) (limited precedent opinion).
76. Wis. STAT. § 804.11(1)(b) (1993-94).
77. Id.
78. Hurt v. Coyne Cylinder Co., 124 F.R.D. 614, 615 (W.D. Tenn. 1989). The Hurt court
held:
When the intended functional purpose of Rule 36 is considered, the fact that the rule
on requests for admissions is included in the discovery section of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure seems little reason to cut off the reasonable utilization of requests for
admissions before trial as is usually done with discovery. This court concludes that [a]
Rule 36 request for admissions is not included within the parameters of a general cutoff
for discovery in a scheduling order.
Ld.
79. For example, Local Rule 7.03 of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin limits parties to 15 interrogatories unless prior court approval is obtained. E.D.
Wis. R. 7.03.
80. Photon, Inc. v. Harris Intertype, Inc., 28 F.R.D. 327, 328 (D. Mass. 1961).
81. Berry v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 110 F.R.D. 441, 442-43 (N.D. Ind. 1986).
82. Shawmut, Inc. v. American Viscose Corp., 12 F.R.D. 488, 489 (D. Mass. 1952).
83. Misco, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 784 F.2d 198, 206 (6th Cir. 1986).
84. Coius & LErrNER, supra note 29, § 5.15. More important, if the drafter specifically
and unequivocally identifies each matter upon which admission is requested, the answering
party will be hard pressed to argue that such requests, although numerous, constitute an un-
due or oppressive burden. Ild.
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There is no limit on the number of times a party may serve requests
for admission on an adversary. 5 The rules recognize the value of multi-
ple requests for admission. 6 A party may, and should, serve multiple
requests for admission as he or she learns more about the case.87 Some
attorneys serve a first set of requests with the initial pleading,88 a second
set to follow up interrogatories, a third set to pin down deponents, and a
final set shortly before the pretrial conference to narrow the issues for
trial.89 Courts have held that successive sets of requests are not burden-
some or oppressive in complex litigation.9"
In simpler cases, economics often dictate the discovery process, limit-
ing most cases to only one set of requests for admission.9 1 In such cases,
requests for admission must fit within the party's overall litigation plan.
In smaller cases, Professor Thomas Mauet suggests using the "building
block" approach to discovery.92 This approach starts with the serving of
interrogatories, which are designed to obtain basic information, such as
the names and addresses of witnesses and the identity and location of
85. JOHN H. YOUNG & TERRI A. ZALL, MASIERING WRrrTN DiscovERY § 7.26 (2d ed.
1994). One of the faults with admissions in complex cases, according to one author, is that
they are usually propounded too early in the case and are so broadly drafted as to invite artful
denial. Admissions should be filed only after considerable thought and should be addressed
to the facts of which each party has personal knowledge or that can be established clearly by
the testimony of others. Id.
86. Epstein, supra note 5, at 30.
87. Id.
88. Mark A. Dombroff, Requests for Admissions: Weighing the Pros and Cons, 19 Tiu~t
82, 85 (1983). An effective tactic is to file a set of requests for admission with the complaint.
The requesting party will have a substantial amount of investigative material prior to the filing
of the complaint. This material, coupled with client consultations, can provide enough infor-
mation to formulate requests at an early stage. The advantage of this approach is that it may
eliminate a great deal of costly discovery and has the potential for securing damaging admis-
sions from the answering party before he or she has had a chance to formulate a case strategy.
Id.
89. See id. at 82, 85. The first set of requests should be sent out before the opponent's
deposition, so that the opponent's deposition testimony will be restricted to the admissions
made in response to the first request. A second set should be sent out following all deposi-
tions and other written discovery to clear up any ambiguities, and possibly to prepare for
summary judgment. A final set should be sent out just before trial to confirm the propound-
ing party's trial strategy. See id.
90. United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Info. Ctr., Inc., 25 F.R.D. 346, 347 (S.D.N.Y.
1960).
91. One tactic a lawyer should carefully watch out for, no matter which side of the case he
or she is on, is the filing of requests for admissions with the initial pleadings. It is easy for the
attorney to overlook these early requests, resulting in a late fMling. In such circumstances, the
requesting party will claim that, because there was a great deal of discovery yet to come, he or
she has relied on the deemed admission to the requesting party's prejudice. MARK A. DOM-
BROFF, DIScoVERY § 6.14, at 275 (1986).
92. THOMAS A. MAUFT, PRRLUA.L 176 (2d ed. 1993).
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documents and other tangible evidence. In some instances, contention
interrogatories may also be used to discover an adversary's position on
disputed facts.
Once the answer to the' interrogatories is received, requests to pro-
duce documents should be served on all parties. The requests to pro-
duce should seek all relevant documents, records, photographs and other
tangible evidence, including any such evidence identified in the answer
to the interrogatories. The requesting party may also demand access to
an adversary's land to inspect, analyze, or photograph things on it.3
This would also be the time to serve document subpoenas on non-
parties.
After the requested documents and other tangible items are received,
depositions should be taken of the opposing party and all essential wit-
nesses. Depositions are designed to obtain detailed information from
parties and non-parties, and to tie down each of them to a particular
account of the relevant events.94 Depositions are also useful for ob-
taining admissions and other impeachment material. In cases where a
party's physical or mental condition is at issue, a physical or mental ex-
amination of the party may be warranted at this point in the discovery
process. 95 In such cases, the requesting party must seek an order from
the court requiring an adversary to appear for examination.96
After all other discovery has been completed, requests for admission
should be served on the answering party. The conventional wisdom on
requests for admission is to use them near the end of discovery to
doublecheck the completeness of your factual investigation.97 The re-
quests for admission are designed to streamline the issues for trial and to
pin down the answering party on positions he or she took during deposi-
tion or in answers to interrogatories. The requests are also designed to
establish foundational facts for the admission of documents and other
tangible evidence. According to Professor Mauet, requests for admis-
sion are formidable weapons in small and moderate cases.98
93. Id. at 171.
94. Id.
95. Id. In cases likely to settle before trial, Professor Mauet suggests waiting to demand a
physical or mental examination until trial is imminent. This approach has the potential to
avoid unnecessary expense. l at 173.
96. See Wis. STAT. § 804.10 (1993-94).
97. THEODoRE Y. BLtmOFF ET AL., PRETRiAL DISCOVERY § 10.1, at 349 (1993).
98. See MAuET, supra note 92, at 235.
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2. Form of Requests
Each matter of which an admission is requested must be separately
set forth in short, numbered paragraphs. 99 Requests should be simple
and direct statements containing a single proposition.10 0 When requests
for admission are drafted in simple and precise terms, they go far toward
eliminating wasted time and expense in litigation.101 If each request con-
tains one simple factual statement, the respondent will be forced to
make an unequivocal admission or denial. Requests should be written in
plain English, not legalese. For example, a simple, concise request
should read: "Defendant Robert Smith is a.resident of the State of Wis-
consin." 2 Indeed, one court has held that: "A request for an admission,
except in a most unusual circumstance, should be such that it could be
answered yes, no, the answerer does not know, or a very simple direct
explanation given as to why he cannot answer, such as in the case of
privilege." 0 3
An effective drafting technique that can make evasion of the request
more difficult is to follow each request for admission with an interro-
gatory that states, "If you deny this request, set forth each fact upon
which you base your denial."' 4 Because answering this type of interro-
99. Wis. STAT. § 804.11(1)(b) (1993-94).
100. All litigants, including pro se parties, must comply with the procedures set forth in
section 804.11. See Hudec Law Office v. Skowronski, No. 93-2649, 1994 Wisc. App. LEXIS
1094, at *3-4 (Ct. App. Sep. 7, 1994) (limited precedent opinion).
101. Kenney, supra note 1, at 4.
102. For examples of well drafted requests for admission, see CoRus & LEITNER, supra
note 29, § 5.26.
103. Johnstone v. Cronlund, 25 F.AD. 42, 46 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
104. Dombroff, supra note 88, at 83. The following type of interrogatory is effective for
accomplishing this purpose:
If your response to any request for admission is other than an unqualified admission,
state for each such request for admission the following:
(1) All facts (not opinions) that you contend support in any manner your refusal to,
admit or your admission.
(2) Identify all documents, notes, reports, memorandums, electronic and/or tape
recordings, photographs, oral statements, or any other tangible or intangible thing that
supports in any manner your refusal to admit or your qualification of your admission.
Identification is to be sufficient to identify the aforesaid things in a request for
production.
(3) The name and address of a custodian of all tangible or intangible things identi-
fied in response to (2) above.
(4) The name and address of all persons, including consultants, purporting to have
any knowledge or factual data upon which you base your refusal to admit or the qualifi-
cation of your admission.
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gatory is more burdensome than simply admitting the request, it often
eliminates frivolous denials. 105
Except when authentication of documents is sought, requests for ad-
mission should not incorporate outside material, such as pleadings, mo-
tions, or deposition transcripts. Incorporation by reference is improper
because it unjustly casts upon the answering party the burden of deter-
mining at its peril what portions of the incorporated material contain
relevant matters of fact that must be either admitted or denied.'0 6 Facts
admitted in response to a request for admission should be ascertainable
merely by examination of the request and of the answer.10 7 The requests
for admission and the answeis should be in such a form so as to be read
to the jury, without reference to extraneous materials. Incorporation by
reference also gives the answering party too much room to evade the
admission. In complex cases, drafting attorneys should also consider de-
fining terms that will be used in more than one request.10 8 An instruc-
tion section may also be appropriate in complicated cases.10 9
C. Authentication of Documents
Requests for admission may expedite the trial process by establishing
evidentiary foundations that would otherwise consume considerable trial
time." 0 Using admissions for this purpose is common practice in Wis-
consin."' It is not enough to ask the answering party to admit that a
document is genuine; rather, the requesting party must ensure that all
foundational questions are included in the requests for admission."' If a
request asks the respondent to admit the genuineness of a document, the
document should be attached to the request and incorporated by refer-
ence therein." 3 For example, requests for admission, if used properly,
can avoid lengthy foundation testimony:
105. Id.
106. WRIGHT & Mn.LER, supra note 13, § 2258, at 548 n.14.
107. Id § 2258.
108. The use of definition sections in requests for admission has been approved by the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin. See Michael A.P. v. Solsrud, 178 Wis. 2d 137, 502 N.W.2d 918
(1993), review denied, 179 Wis. 2d clxxxvii, 508 N.W.2d 422 (1993).
109. BLUMoFE ET AL., supra note 97, § 10.7.
110. CoRgIs & LEITNER, supra note 29, § 5.6.
111. See, e.g., First Wis. Nat'l Bank of Milw. v. Spears, No. 79-1693 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug.
13, 1980) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc file) (limited precedent opinion) (plaintiff was fore-
warned of potential problem with exhibit because defendant denied its authenticity in a re-
quest for admission); Roberts v. Thompson, No. 78-231 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 1979) (limited
precedent opinion) (exhibits authenticated by requests for admission).
112. CoRMs & LErrNER, supra note 29, § 5.6.
113. Wis. STAT. § 804.11(1)(a) (1993-94).
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[W]hen a party seeks to introduce business records under the
hearsay exception of sec. 908.03(6), Stats., the party would nor-
mally be required to call a foundation witness who could testify
that the record was made at or about the time of the events re-
flected, that it was found where such records are normally kept,
that the record was kept in the ordinary course of business, and
that it was the organization's regular practice to make and keep
records like the exhibit sought to be introduced.114
The proper foundation for such documents can be established well in
advance of trial, saving both time and money.115 In addition, a request
may ask the answering party to admit the genuineness of documents be-
longing to someone other than the answering party, as long as the an-
swering party has reasonable access to such documents." 6 Requests for
admission can also be used to authenticate photographs." 7
Section 804.11 does not require that the document be attached to a
request for admission. Rather it provides that "[c]opies of documents
shall be served with the request unless they have been or are otherwise
furnished or made available for inspection and copying.""' 8 If a docu-
ment has already been identified in discovery, such as an exhibit in a
prior deposition, it need not be attached to the requests for admission, so
long as there is no question about the document to which the requesting
party is referring. 19
D. Disadvantages
Unlike other forms of discovery, there are few disadvantages to using
requests for admission. Answers to requests are only binding on the
party who made them. Neither the requests nor the answers are binding
on the party who propounded the requests for admission. A litigant
does not bind himself to the truth of an admission by another party by
submitting the request for admission.120 The requesting party may disre-
114. Comus & LErTNER, supra note 29, § 5.6.
115. Id
116. Id
117. SHEPA.D's, supra note 61, § 9.4.
118. WIs. STAT. § 804.11(1)(a).
119. Kenney, supra note 2, at 8. For example, "The plaintiff admits that the Lease Agree-
ment marked as Exhibit A to the plaintiff's deposition is a genuine copy of the lease agree-
ment in effect between the plaintiff and the defendant from January 1, 1990 to January 1, 1991,
for Apartment 3 at 100 Main Street in Boston, Massachusetts."
120. Hajek v. Kappas, No. 91-2221, 1992 Wisc. App. LEXIS 302, at *3 (Ct. App. Mar. 17,
1992) (limited precedent opinion).
1995]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
gard an answer, even though he or she chooses to offer other answers
from the same request into evidence.' 2'
There are, however, some minor disadvantages in propounding re-
quests for admission. First, if requests are drawn too narrowly, they may
reveal the drafting attorney's trial strategy. Second, unless drafted care-
fully and precisely, a denial will probably be upheld by the court, result-
ing in wasted time and money.1' The ease with which answering parties
effectively dodge requests for admission may be the greatest disadvan-
tage.2 3 Often the answering party will respond to a request by stating
that further discovery and investigation is necessary before he or she can
give an intelligent response.2 4 In all likelihood, this response will be
acceptable to the courts, especially early in the litigation. Another dis-
advantage of utilizing requests for admission is that the process of draft-
ing requests may take substantially more time than the process of
answering them.'25 This is particularly true if the answering party can
simply deny the requests. Unfortunately, courts have been reluctant to
intervene in such disputes.
III. SCOPE OF REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION
According to section 804.11, a party may serve upon an adversary a
written request for admission of the truth of any matters within the
scope of section 804.01(2). Section 804.01(2), which is patterned on
FRCP 26(b), provides:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party
seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party
.... It is not ground for objection that the information sought will
be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears rea-
sonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.' 26
Essentially, section 804.11 entitles a party to require any other party to
admit or deny the truthfulness of opinions or facts; the application of law
121. Id.
122. Dombroff, supra note 88, at 83.
123. DOMBROFF, supra note 91, § 6.03.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Wis. STAT. § 804.01(2)(a) (1993-94).
[Vol. 78:625
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION
to fact; or the genuineness of documents.127 The Federal Advisory Com-
mittee explained the scope of FRCP 36 as follows:
[Rule 36(a)] provides that a request may be made to admit any
matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) that relate to statements
or opinions of fact or of the application of law to fact. It thereby
eliminates the requirement that the matter be "of fact." This
change resolves conflicts in the court decisions as to whether a
request to admit matters of "opinion" and matters involving
"mixed law and fact" is proper under the rule .... Not only is it
difficult as a practical matter to separate "fact" from "opinion,"
... but an admission on a matter of opinion may facilitate proof
or narrow the issues or both. An admission of a matter involving
the application of law to fact may, in a given case, even more
clearly narrow the issues. For example, an admission that an em-
ployee acted in the scope of his employment may remove a major
issue from the trial.' 8
In other words, requests can cover almost any issue, simple or com-
plex, '2 9 except pure questions of law.' 30 There are, however, some issues
with which the courts continue to grapple.
A. Opinions
Prior to the 1970 amendments to FRCP 36, a majority of decisions
held that only matters of "fact" were properly the subject of requests for
admission. 31 They sustained objections to requests that asked for opin-
ions or conclusions. 132 In 1970, FRCP 36 was amended to provide that
requests could seek opinions and conclusions. However, requests in-
volving the application of law to fact may, in some instances, be more
appropriate after discovery has been completed. 33 Accordingly, a
change was made to FRCP 36 that allows the court to postpone final
disposition of a request until a pretrial conference has been held.134
127. See Patricia Graczyk, The New Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure: Chapter 804, 59
MARQ. L. REv. 463, 520 (1976).
128. 1970 Note, supra note 23, at 567-68.
129. Epstein, supra note 5, at 30.
130. GRENIG & HARVEY, supra note 48, § 411.2, at 567.
131. WRiGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, § 2255, at 530.
132. Ld.
133. It at 535.
134. See Wis. STAT. § 804.11(2) (1993-94).
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B. Ultimate Facts
The use of a request for admission to establish an ultimate issue in a
case has been tested three times in Wisconsin, twice on substantive issues
and once on damages. In Schmid v. Olsen,135 the Supreme Court of Wis-
consin reviewed a case in which the trial court relieved a party from the
effect of its failure to respond to a request for admission. The request
asked the defendant to admit that he was seventy percent causally negli-
gent. The defendant failed to respond to the request within thirty days,
prompting the plaintiff to argue that the request was deemed admitted
pursuant to section 804.11(1)(b). The trial court ruled that the subject
matter of the request was improper because it involved the ultimate is-
sue in the case.136 The court of appeals affirmed on different grounds,
ruling that even if the requests were proper, withdrawal of the admission
served the presentation of the merits on a genuine issue in the case and
that the plaintiff did not show any prejudice resulting from the
withdrawal.' 37
The majority of the supreme court held that the percentage of causal
negligence, albeit the ultimate issue in the case, was a proper subject for
a request for admission.' 38 Citing a string of federal decisions, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin concluded:
We believe that there is no compelling reason why a request to
admit seventy percent negligence should be considered a nullity.
"The rule [Federal Rule 36] is designed to expedite litigation, and
it permits the party securing admissions to rely on their binding
effect.' '139
In dissent, Justice Steinmetz, joined by Justice Beilfuss, asserted that the
percentage of causal negligence is not a proper subject for a request for
admission." Justice Steinmetz declared that the percentage of negli-
gence is not relevant to the case, nor does it tend to lead to the discovery
of other relevant evidence. Permitting such requests, according to Jus-
tice Steinmetz, will complicate and increase litigation, as litigants will be
inclined to use requests for admission in an effort to catch their adversa-
ries off guard.
135. 111 Wis. 2d 228, 330 N.W.2d 547 (1983).
136. Id at 230-31, 330 N.W.2d at 549.
137. 1d at 231, 330 N.W.2d at 549.
138. Id. at 235-36, 330 N.W.2d at 551.
139. l at 236-37 n.4, 330 N.W.2d at 551 n.4 (quoting Rainbolt v. Johnson, 669 F.2d 767,
768 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
140. Id at 240, 330 N.W.2d at 553 (Steinmetz, J., dissenting).
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During the same term, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin issued a de-
cision in Bank of Two Rivers v. Zimmer,141 in which it upheld the trial
court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff based on
the defendants' failure to respond in a timely fashion to the plaintiff's
requests for admission. The case consisted of a quiet title action. The
plaintiff requested the defendants to admit that they had no interest of
record in the disputed parcel of land, which for all practical purposes was
the ultimate issue in the case. The defendants failed to respond to the
request within thirty days, resulting in a deemed admission. Based on
this admission, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
plaintiff.142 The court of appeals affirmed. The supreme court also af-
firmed, finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deeming
the unanswered request admitted. The supreme court also approved the
use of summary judgment based solely upon a party's untimely or in-
complete response to a request for admission. 43
The decisions in Schmid and Bank of Two Rivers confirm that re-
quests for admission can be directed at the ultimate facts in the case. If
the answering party admits the ultimate issue or fails to respond in a
proper or timely fashion, the admissions may be used as a basis for sum-
mary judgment. 44 This is true even if the ultimate issue is one on which
the requesting party has the burden of proof.' 45
Not every disputed fact, however, is the proper subject of a request
for admission. In Kettner v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co.,1 4 6 the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that the value of a personal injury
claim is not a proper subject for a request for admission. The defendant
in that case requested that the plaintiff admit that "'the value of the
plaintiff's claim for injuries in this case, taking into account his own con-
tributory negligence does not exceed $100,000.' "147 The defendant ad-
mitted that the statement was true. At trial, the jury awarded the
141. 112 Wis. 2d 624, 334 N.W.2d 230 (1983).
142. Id. at 626-28, 334 N.W.2d at 231-32.
143. Id. at 630-31, 334 N.W.2d at 233.
144. See, eg., Satell v. Continental Cas. Co., No. 89-1079,1990 Wise. App. LEXIS 658, at
*5, 8 (Ct. App. Mar. 13, 1990) (limited precedent opinion); Schultz v. Abrams, No. 86-1433
(Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 1987) (LEXIS, States library, Wise file) (limited prcedent opinion);
Backus v. Dunn, No. 84-799 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 1985) (LEXIS, States library, Wise file)
(limited precedent opinion); Wiegel v. Sentry Indem. Co., Nos. 82-1076 and 82-1400 (Wis. Ct.
App. Sept. 22, 1983) (LEXIS, States library, Wise file) (limited precedent opinion).
145. Adventures in Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places to Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d 809, 812 (7th
Cir. 1942).
146. 146 Wis. 2d 636, 431 N.W.2d 737 (Ct. App. 1988).
147. Id. at 638, 431 N.W.2d at 738 (quoting a request to admit).
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plaintiff a net amount of $158,956.148 The defendant moved to limit the
plaintiff's recovery to $100,000 based upon the plaintiff's earlier admis-
sion. The trial court denied the defendant's motion.149
The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the subject matter of
the admission was improper because "while certain components of a
claim, such as past or future medical bills or lost wages are proper sub-
jects for a sec. 804.11 request for admission, the claim's total value, in-
cluding disability and pain and suffering, is not."'150 The court gave
several reasons for its decision. First, section 804.11, if used to value
claims, would be inconsistent with section 807.01,11 which provides a
mechanism for making offers of settlement or judgment. Allowing a re-
quest for admission as to the value of a claim would defeat the policy
that favors settlement of claims by providing a means to evade section
807.01.152 Second, it is difficult, if not impossible, according to the court
of appeals, to place a precise value on a personal injury claim months or
years before trial. Consequently, a request for admission seeking such
information is inherently prejudicial.
The defendant in Ketner argued that the case was controlled by the
decisions in Schmid and Bank of Two Rivers, in which the supreme court
approved the use of requests for admission of ultimate issues. The
Kettner court disagreed, stating that Schmid and Bank of Two Rivers
both involved the "application of a legal concept to a set of facts, which
are fixed in time and susceptible to valuation."' 53 Conversely, the value
of a claim, especially in a personal injury case, is inherently variable,
148. Id. at 639, 431 N.W.2d at 738. The jury awarded plaintiff $227,080.05, which was
reduced to $158,956.03 because plaintiff was found contributorily negligent. Id.
149. 1d at 639-40, 431 N.W.2d at 738.
150. Id at 641, 431 N.W.2d at 739.
151. Wis. STAT. § 807.01(1) (1993-94) provides:
After issue is joined but at least 20 days before the trial, the defendant may serve upon
the plaintiff a written offer to allow judgment to be taken against the defendant for the
sum, or property, or to the effect therein specified, with costs. If the plaintiff accepts
the offer and serves notice thereof in writing, before trial and within 10 days after
receipt of the offer, the plaintiff may file the offer, with proof of service of the notice of
acceptance, and the clerk must thereupon enter judgment accordingly. If notice of ac-
ceptance is not given, the offer cannot be given as evidence nor mentioned on the trial.
If the offer of judgment is not accepted and the plaintiff fails to recover a more
favorable judgment, the plaintiff shall not recover costs but defendant shall recover
costs to be computed on the demand of the complaint.
152. Kettner, 146 Wis. 2d at 641, 431 N.W.2d at 739. An accepted offer of settlement
under § 807.01 ends the case, but an admission does not. Id
153. Id. at 643, 431 N.W.2d at 740.
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being based on a series of factors that constantly change prior to and
during the trial.
C. Pure Questions of Law
The application of law to fact is a proper subject of a request for
admission. Pure questions of law, however, are not. For example, a re-
quest by an alleged patent infringer asking the patent holder to admit
that certain patent claims are invalid is an improper request for admis-
sion. 54 Likewise, a request for admission asking a party to admit that it
owed a legal duty to others may be improper.' 55 It would also be inap-
propriate to ask a party to admit that it was proper to remove a state
court action to federal district court. 6 There is no Wisconsin authority
on this point.
IV. RBSPONDING TO REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION
The response to a request for admission must be in writing and must
be signed by the party or the party's attorney. 5 7 Wisconsin Statutes sec-
tion 802.05, the counterpart to FRCP 11, governs the signing of the re-
sponse.'58 Generally, the response must be served on the requesting
party's attorney within thirty days after service of the request. 5 9 When
responding to a request for admission, the party must consider the im-
pact of the response upon the case.' 6
The more harmful the impact an admission may have upon a case,
the more scrutiny an attorney should devote to uncovering objec-
tions or drafting good-faith qualifying answers or denials. This
scrutiny must also weigh the risk that the [requesting] party may
challenge the sufficiency of a response that is not an admission. 161
Thus, a nonadmission may increase expenses and time disproportion-
ately to its impact on a case.162
There are several possible responses to a request for admission, in-
cluding: an admission; a denial; an answer admitting part and denying
154. Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 130 F.R.D. 92, 96
(N.D. Ind. 1990).
155. See Currie v. United States, 111 F.R.D. 56, 59 (M.D.N.C. 1986).
156. Morris v. Marshall County Bd. of Educ., 560 F. Supp. 43,45-46 (N.D. W. Va. 1983).
157. Wis. STAT. § 804.11(1)(b) (1993-94).
158. See id. § 802.05.
159. Id. § 804.11(1)(b). Copies of the response should be served on all other parties to
the action. The original should be maintained by the requesting party. Id § 804.01(6).
160. HAYDocK Er AL., supra note 44, at 437.
161. Id.
162. Id
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part; a statement that the answering party lacks sufficient information to
admit or deny; an objection; a motion for a protective order; a motion
for an extension of time to respond; or an untimely or insufficient re-
sponse (or no response at all).
A. Admission
Section 804.11 does not expressly provide that a party may respond
to a request with an admission, but the propriety of such a response is
implicit in the language of the statute.163 "The obligation to admit
should exist whenever a party is convinced that a proposition is true,
regardless of the factors which led to his conviction. Whether the belief
is based on personal observation or information furnished by others, a
proposition that is not disputed should be conceded."'" An admission
conclusively establishes the statement in the request, unless the court on
motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission.165 An ad-
mission made by a party can be used only in the action in which it is
made and cannot be used for any other purpose.1 66
B. Denial
A denial should specifically deny the request for admission or set
forth in detail the reasons why the answering party cannot truthfully ad-
mit or deny the matter. A denial
shall fairly meet the substance of the requested admission, and
when good faith requires that a party qualify an answer or deny
only a part of the matter of which an admission is requested, the
party shall specify so much of it as is true and qualify or deny the
remainder. 67
Denials should be forthright, specific, and unconditional. 168 If a re-
sponse is thought insufficient as a denial, the court may treat it as an
admission. 69 Prior to 1970, some courts thought that an insufficient de-
nial should automatically be taken as an admission, but the 1970 amend-
ments to FRCP 36 provided a procedure by which the requesting party
may move to determine the sufficiency of the answer.' 70 If the court
163. See CoR~is & LEITNER, supra note 29, § 5.19.
164. Finman, supra note 10, at 406 (footnotes omitted).
165. Wis. STAT. § 804.11(2) (1993-94).
166. itL
167. lId § 804.11(1)(b).
168. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, § 2260, at 555.
169. I&
170. See Wis. STAT. § 804.11(1)(c) (1994-95).
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determines that the answer is insufficient, it may either order that the
matter is admitted or that an amended answer be served.171 The reason
for this modification to FRCP 36 was:
Giving a defective answer the automatic effect of an admission
may cause unfair surprise. A responding party who purported to
deny or to be unable to admit or deny will for the first time at
trial confront the contention that he has made a binding admis-
sion. Since it is not always easy to know whether a denial is "spe-
cific" or an explanation is "in detail," neither party can know how
the court will rule at trial and whether proof must be prepared.
Some courts, therefore, have entertained motions to rule on de-
fective answers. They have at times ordered that amended an-
swers be served, when the defects were technical, and at other
times have declared that the matter was admitted. 172
In Michael A.P. v. Solsrud,173 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals upheld
the trial court's finding that certain answers to requests for admission
were insufficient. For instance, the answering party denied all requests
for admission that contained "terms of art," such as general contractor
or agent, even though the court found that the nature and meaning of
these phrases were clear and unambiguous. The answering party's deni-
als, according to the court, were nothing more than "hypertectmical, se-
mantic gymnastics." 174 The court concluded that the responses were
made in bad faith and thus awarded fees to the requesting party.
Federal courts have also been hostile to qualified admissions and de-
nials, often deeming such responses to be unequivocal admissions. 175 A
denial of the accuracy of the matters stated in the request, but not of the
essential truth of such matters, has been held an admission. 17 6 Likewise,
a flat refusal to admit or deny has been deemed an admission, and a
failure to respond to a particular part of a request has been treated as an
admission of that part.17 7 Disingenuous, hair-splitting denials are strictly
prohibited.
171. Id. In federal court, when filing a motion to determine the sufficiency of an answer
to a request for admission, Local Rule 6.02 of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin requires the requesting party to attach a statement to the motion that
sets forth the informal attempts the parties have made to resolve the dispute. E.D. Wis. R.
6.02.
172. 1970 Note, supra note 23.
173. 178 Wis. 2d 137,502 N.W.2d 918 (Ct. App. 1993), review denied, 179 Wis. 2d clxxxvii,
508 N.W2d 422 (1993).
174. Id. at 150, 502 N.W.2d at 923.
175. Coiuus & LEMrrER, supra note 29, § 5.21.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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The fact that a party has denied a statement in some other pleading
or discovery device does not constitute a denial of the same statement in
a request for admission. A denial of similar facts in interrogatories, 7 s
depositions, 79 or in answers to complaints does not operate as a denial
of requests for admission.18° A denial of a request for admission is not
conclusive, but merely leaves the issue open for trial.' , '
C. Admitting Part and Denying Part
When good faith requires, a party may qualify an answer or deny part
and admit part of the request for admission."S Section 804.11 requires
that the answering party admit those portions of a request that he or she
knows are true, while allowing the answering party to deny the remain-
ing matters. Attorneys should take care when making such a qualified
answer, as courts may deem the entire request admitted if there is any
evidence of bad faith.
It is important that the answers be clear and precise because any am-
biguity can be costly for the answering party. If the answering party de-
cides to partially admit and partially deny a request for admission, it is
inadvisable to phrase the answer: "Admitted, but deny ... ". 183 The risk
of such a response is that the court will strike everything following the
word "Admitted." The preferred response is: "Denied, but admit ......
By following this form, the requesting party is less likely to seek to strike
portions of the answer.'"
D. Lack of Information
An answering party may not give lack of information or knowledge
as a reason for failure to admit or deny unless the party states that he or
she has made a reasonable inquiry and that the information known or
readily obtainable by the party is insufficient to enable the party to ad-
178. Weiner v. Green Bay & W.R.R., No. 91-3078-Fr, 1992 Wisc. App. LEXIS 781, at *3
(Ct. App. July 28, 1992) (limited precedent opinion). Requests for admissions and interroga-
tories are separate and alternative forms of discovery. The concurrent use of interrogatories
does not eliminate the duty to respond to a request for admission. Id.
179. Michael A.P., 178 Wis. 2d at 153, 502 N.W.2d at 925 (answer to requests for admis-
sion may not be amended by subsequent deposition testimony).
180. Schmid v. Olsen, 111 Wis. 2d 228, 235-36, 330 N.W.2d 547, 551 (1983) (defendants'
denial of fact in answer to complaint cannot substitute for denial of same fact in requests for
admission).
181. GRENIG & HARVEY, supra note 48, § 411.5, at 574-75.
182. Wis. STAT. § 804.11(1)(b) (1993-94).
183. Dombroff, supra note 88 at 84.
184. Id
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mit or deny.'8 5 If the answering party responds to a request for admis-
sion by stating that he or she lacks sufficient information to answer, the
response must set forth in detail the reasons why this is so. 18 6 This re-
quirement alerts the requesting party to any deficiencies in the request,
so that they can be cured in follow-up requests. A general statement
that the answering party can neither admit nor deny, unaccompanied by
reasons, is an insufficient response.'87
The mere fact that the request concerns information possessed or
known by someone other than the answering party does not, by itself,
constitute an inability to admit or deny. 88 This principle was explained
by the Advisory Committee as follows:
The revised rule [FRCP 36] requires only that the answering party
make reasonable inquiry and secure such knowledge and infor-
mation as are readily obtainable by him. In most instances, the
investigation will be necessary either to his own case or to the
preparation for rebuttal. Even when it is not, the information
may be close enough at hand to be "readily obtainable." Rule 36
requires only that a party state that he has taken these steps. 189
Reasonable inquiry may require questioning third parties, other litigants,
or other attorneys in the case.190 It may also require the answering party
to conduct independent research to verify the statements in the requests
for admission. 91 A party is not required to make an admission, how-
ever, if there is a reasonable ground for concluding on the basis of all
admissible evidence known to the party that the requesting party may
not prevail on the issue at trial.191 Care should be taken in making such
a response. If the court later finds the response was insufficient, the re-
quest may be deemed admitted.
185. Wis. STAT. § 804.11(1)(b) (1993-94); see also Graczyk, supra note 127, at 520.
186. WRIGHr & MMLER, supra note 13, § 2261, at 556-57. Attorneys formulating answers
alleging the inability to admit or deny should provide details in their response of the sources
consulted, the information obtained from those sources, and the reasons why that information
is insufficient to permit an outright denial or admission. Comus & LErrNER, supra note 29,
§ 5.22.
187. WIGrHT & MILLER, supra note 13, § 2261, at 557.
188. CoRms & LErrNER, supra note 29, § 5.22.
189. 1970 Note, supra note 23.
190. Atkinson & White, supra note 3, at 53. But see Dubin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc.,
125 F.R.D. 372,374-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (reasonable inquiry does not require answering party
to interview former employee).
191. Atkinson & White, supra note 3, at 53.
192. See Shapiro, supra note 31, at 1088.
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E. Extension of Time to Respond
If the answering party cannot in good faith formulate a response to
the requests for admission within the time allowed by section 804.11, the
answering party should move for an extension of time to respond. The
motion should be made well in advance of the expiration of the response
period.193 The trial court has the authority to shorten or lengthen the
time for response.' 94 It is advisable to obtain court approval of any ex-
tension of time to respond, as the court may not be bound by informal
agreements between counsel. 95
F. Objecting to Requests for Admission
Objections to requests for admission must be made in writing and
served upon the requesting party within the time allowed for answering
the requests. 96 If some of the requests are to be answered and others
objected to, the answers and objections should be contained in a single
document. 97 The answering party must set forth in detail the basis of
the objection. General objections are insufficient. 198 Failure to make a
timely objection may result in waiver of the objection. In addition, the
answering of a request for admission may constitute a waiver of any
objection. 19 9
Objections may be directed to the form or the substance of the re-
quest. As to the form of the request, objections are appropriate when
the request contains compound or multiple facts, as section 804.11 re-
quires that requests be "separately set forth.' '20 0 An objection may also
193. See generally Wis. STAT. § 801.15(2)(a) (1993-94) (discussing time period
enlargement).
194. Id 804.11(1)(b). Note that motions to shorten the time in which answering parties
have to respond have met with resistance in the courts. See, e.g., Depew v. Hanover Ins. Co.,
76 F.R.D. 8, 9 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (motion to shorten period to 15 days was denied where
requesting party had ample time to serve request in a manner so as to allow the answering
party 30 days to respond); Winslow v. Romer, 123 B.R. 74, 76 (D. Colo. 1990) (requesting
party's desire to" 'get at truth quickly' " was insufficient justification to shorten time in which
answering party had to respond).
195. Compare Gilbert C. Schumm, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 216: How to Use Requests
to Admit, 73 ILL. B.J. 338, 341 (1985) with Kenney, supra note 1, at 11 (an extension can be
obtained by either stipulation with opposing counsel or through a motion). See also Wis.
STAT. § 804.04 (1993-94) (providing for modification of discovery procedures by written
stipulation).
196. GsmMG & HARVEy, supra note 48, § 411.4, at 571.
197. Id.
198. Id,
199. Pleasant Hill Bank v. United States, 60 F.R.D. 1 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
200. Wis. STAT. § 804.11(1)(b) (1993-94).
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be made if the request is vague or ambiguous.201 Requests that are argu-
mentative in nature are also objectionable.2 "2
Before identifying valid objections, it is worth noting that there are
several objections that are insufficient. A request for admission is not
objectionable simply because the requesting party already knows the
fact)20 3 nor is it proper to base an objection on the ground that the fact is
public knowledge.2 4 It is not a ground for objection that the request
relates to a matter on which the requesting party has the burden of
proof. It is also not a sufficient ground that the request is directed at the
ultimate issue in the case,20 5 nor is it sufficient that the request seeks
opinions or conclusions. The answering party may not object on the
ground that he or she lacks personal knowledge of the matter so long as
the information is readily available. 6 It is also improper to object on
the ground that the admissions may be accomplished more expeditiously
at a pretrial hearing.20 7
All of the standard discovery privileges and objections apply to re-
quests for admissions.20 8 An objection that the admission sought is
neither admissible nor reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evi-
dence is sufficient.20 9 If the admission sought is protected from disclo-
sure by a privilege, the objection will be sustained.210 The privilege
against self-incrimination has caused some difficulty. The privilege is or-
dinarily available in civil litigation due to the fear that information elic-
ited in a civil proceeding will be used in a criminal prosecution. Section
804.11, however, expressly provides that answers to requests for admis-
sion may not be used in any other proceeding or for any other pur-
pose.21 ' Nonetheless, considering the fact that the admission could
provide an incriminating link to other admissible evidence, objections
based on the privilege against self-incrimination should be sustained.212
201. GRENIG & HARvEY, supra note 48, § 411.4, at 571.
202. Griffin v. Wilhelmsen, 24 F.R.D. 431, 432, 434 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
203. GRENIG & HARVEY, supra note 48, § 411.4, at 571.
204. Dombroff, supra note 88, at 84.
205. See supra section HLB. A party may deny such a request, subject to section
804.12(1)(c), and set forth the reasons for such denial.
206. WRIGHT & MLR, supra note 13, § 2262, at 562.
207. United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Info. Ctr., Inc., 25 F.R.D. 346,347 (S.D.N.Y.
1960).
208. Kenney, supra note 1, at 12.
209. Wis. STAT. § 804.01(2)(a) (1993-94).
210. Id.
211. Id § 804.11(2).
212. See; WRIGHTr & MMLER, supra note 13, at 562-63.
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The work product privilege has also caused some difficulty.213 Accord-
ing to federal authority, the work product doctrine protects only docu-
ments and other tangible things, and not answers to requests for
admission, as explained:
The courts have consistently held that the work product concept
furnishes no shield against discovery, by interrogatories or by
deposition, of the facts that the adverse party's lawyer has
learned, or the persons from whom he has learned such facts, or
the existence or nonexistence of documents, even though the doc-
uments themselves may not be subject to discovery.214
Section 804.11 sets forth a procedure for objecting to requests for
admission. When an objection is made, the answering party does not
have to move for a hearing on the objection. The answering party simply
serves the objections on the requesting party. The burden is on the re-
questing party to move for an order determining the sufficiency of the
objection.215 Unless the court determines that an objection is justified,
the court must order that an answer be served.21 6 Recall that if the an-
swering party submits an insufficient answer, the court can order either
that the matter is admitted or that an amended answer be served. A
different approach is taken with objections found to be improper. If an
objection is overruled, the court may only order that an answer be
served; it cannot deem the answer admitted. 17
Requests may be so voluminous that the answering party finds the
task of responding unduly burdensome or expensive. According to the
Advisory Committee: "[R]equests to admit may be so voluminous and
so framed that the answering party finds the task of identifying what is in
dispute and what is not unduly burdensome. If so, the responding
party may obtain a protective order under Rule 26(c) [section
213. See generally Wis. STAT. § 804.01(2) (1993-94) (providing scope of discovery).
214. Baise v. Alewel's, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 95, 96 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (quoting 8 CHARLES A.
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2033, at 194 (1970)).
215. Wis. STAT. § 804.11(1)(c) (1993-94), which provides:
The party who has requested the admissions may move to determine the sufficiency of
the answers or objections. Unless the court determines that an objection is justified, it
shall order that an answer be served. If the court determines that an answer does not
comply with this section, it may order either that the matter is admitted or that an
amended answer be served. The court may, in lieu of these orders, determine that final
disposition of the request be made at a pretrial conference or at a designated time prior
to trial. Section 804.12(1)(c) applies to the award of expenses incurred in relation to
the motion.
216. The losing party in this hearing will ordinarily be required to pay the opponent's
expenses under section 804.12(1)(c). GRENIG & HARvEY, supra note 48, § 411.4, at 572.
217. CoRRis & LEITNER, supra note 29, § 5.20.
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804.11(3)(c)].''1 8 The answering party must file a motion with the court
to obtain a protective order pursuant to section 804.01(3)(a). If the re-
quests subject the answering party to annoyance, embarrassment, op-
pression, or undue burden or expense, the court has the discretion to
strike the entire set of requests, reduce the number of requests, or ex-
tend the time in which the answering party has to respond.2 19 A protec-
tive order would be appropriate, for example, when the answering party
is served with hundreds of requests for admission, seeking redundant,
cumulative, or patently immaterial information. 0 For instance, a fed-
eral court entered a protective order in a case in which 1,664 requests for
admission were served on the plaintiff in an employment discrimination
case.
221
G. Failing to Respond to Requests for Admissions
Section 804.11 is self-executing. If the answering party fails to serve
written answers or objections to the requests for admission within the
time allowed by section 804.11 (and he or she has not obtained an exten-
sion of time or a protective order from the court), the requests are
deemed admitted.' 2  Section 804.11 does not require a court order for
the requests to be deemed admitted2 23 Unless the court permits the
deemed answers to be withdrawn,224 the matter admitted is conclusively
established for all purposes, including summary judgment and trial.
Moreover, deeming the requests admitted does not violate the answering
party's due process rights.225
The self-executing nature of requests for admission, coupled with the
fact that requests can be directed at the ultimate facts in the litigation,
makes this form of discovery very potent and very dangerous. For in-
stance, in Schmid v. Olsen,' 6 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin noted
that the answering party's failure to respond in a timely fashion to a
request directed at the ultimate fact in the case was a sufficient basis for
entering judgment in favor of the requesting party. The failure to re-
218. 1970 Note, supra note 23.
219. Wts. STAT. § 804.01(3)(a) (1993-94).
220. Kenney, supra note 1, at 11.
221. Wigler v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 108 F.R.D. 204, 204 (D. Md. 1985).
222. Wis. STAT. § 804.11(1)(b) (1993-1994).
223. American Bank of Wis. v. Dufek, No. 90-0359, 1990 Wisc. App. LEXIS 968, at *2
(Ct. App. Oct. 23, 1990) (limited precedent opinion).
224. See infra Part VI.
225. State v. Gaynor, No. 83-283 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 1983) (LEXIS, States library,
Wisc file) (limited precedent opinion).
226. 111 Wis. 2d 228, 330 N.W.2d 547 (1983).
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spond to the requests in that case defeated, for all practical purposes,
any defenses the answering party otherwise had.2 7
Similarly, in American Bank v. Dufek,228 the appellate court upheld a
ruling in which the trial court deemed the ultimate facts of the litigation
admitted. In that case, the answering party was asked to admit that he
fraudulently transferred property in an effort to conceal his assets. The
answering party failed to file a timely response, and thus the requests
were deemed admitted. On the basis of the deemed admissions, the
court granted summary judgment in favor of the requesting party. As in
Schmid, failure to respond to the requests for admission resulted in an
adverse judgment against the answering party.229
H. Supplementing a Response
According to section 804.01(5), a party is under a duty to amend a
prior response if he or she obtains information upon the basis of which
(1) the party knows that the response was incorrect when made or (2)
the party knows that the response though correct when made is no
longer true and the circumstances are such that a failure to amend the
response is in substance a knowing concealment.230 The obligation to
supplement applies to answers to requests for admission."31 The re-
questing party is not required to specifically ask for supplementation; the
duty to supplement is imposed on the answering party.232 Moreover, the
answering party may not supplement an answer to a request for admis-
sion through some other source of discovery, such as deposition testi-
mony or answers to interrogatories.3 3
227. Id
228. No. 90-0359, 1990 Wisc. App. LEXIS 968, at *1 (Ct. App. Oct. 23, 1990) (limited
precedent opinion).
229. See also Garrow Oil Corp. v. Majerus, No. 91-2710-Fl, 1992 Wisc. App. LEXIS 774
(Ct. App. July 21, 1992) (limited precedent opinion) (affirming a trial court decision granting
prejudgment interest based on deemed admissions).
230. Wis. STAT. § 804.01(5)(b) (1993-94); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e), which requires a
party to amend or supplement a prior response to a request for admission if the party learns
that for any reason the prior response is incorrect or incomplete.
231. Michael A.P. v. Solsrud, 178 Wis. 2d 137, 153,502 N.W.2d 918, 924 (Ct. App. 1993),
review denied, 179 Wis. 2d clxxxvii, 508 N.W.2d 422 (1993).
232. Jenzake v. City of Brookfield, 108 Wis. 2d 537,540,322 N.W.2d 516,518-19 (Ct. App.
1982) (applying rule to interrogatories).
233. Michael A.P., 178 Wis. 2d at 153, 502 N.W.2d at 924.
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V. EFFEcr OF AN ADMISSION
Any matter admitted under section 804.11 is conclusively established,
unless the court permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission. 234
The requesting party is entitled to rely on the binding effect of the ad-
mission.235 This binding effect sets requests for admission apart from all
other discovery procedures and, in effect, places such admissions on par
with judicial admissions.3 6 Once an admission is made it supersedes the
pleadings.237 Answers to interrogatories, deposition testimony, and
statements made in documents are merely "evidentiary" admissions; the
party who made such statements is free to contradict them at trial, sub-
ject, of course, to impeachment.3 8
Conclusively established facts, on the other hand, are no longer is-
sues and cannot be contradicted or impeached at trial by evidence or on
summary judgment by affidavits.239 As one court put it:
An answer to a request under Rule 36 is unlike a statement of
fact by a witness made in the course of oral evidence at a trial, or
in oral pre-trial depositions, or even in written answers to inter-
rogatories. It is on the contrary a studied response, made under
sanctions against easy denials, to a request to assert the truth or
falsity of a relevant fact pointed out by the request for admission.
[R]equests for admission, although answered under oath of a
party,' 4m are normally made under the direction and supervision
of counsel, who has full professional realization of their signifi-
234. Wis. STAT. § 804.11(2) (1993-94), which reads:
Any matter admitted under this section is conclusively established unless the court on
motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission. Subject to [sec.] 802.11
governing amendment of a pretrial order, the court may permit withdrawal or amend-
ment when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and
the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or
amendment will prejudice the party in maintaining the action or defense on the merits.
Any admission made by a party under this section is for the purpose of the pending
action only and is not an admission for any other purpose nor may it be used against
the party in any other proceeding.
235. GRENIG & HARVEY, supra note 48, § 411.5, at 573.
236. Id.
237. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.10, at 405 (2d ed. 1993).
238. CoRms & LErrNER, supra note 29, at § 5.9; see also Umentum v. Kraft, No. 77-827,
(Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 1979) (LEXIS, States library, Wise file) (limited precedent opinion)
(stating that an evidentiary admission is subject to contradiction or explanation and does not
become conclusive unless the adverse party fails to meet it with contrary evidence).
239. Schultz v. Abrams, No. 86-1433 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 1987) (LEXIS, States library,
Wise file) (limited precedent opinion).
240. FRCP 36 no longer requires that a response be signed by the party under oath. FED.
R. Cwy. P. 36(a).
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cance. Therefore, their similarity to sworn testimony in one re-
spect should not reduce their effect from conclusive admissions to
merely evidential ones.24 1
The admissions serve to eliminate disputes of material fact,2 2 barring all
evidence inconsistent with the admissions. 43
A. Use in Summary Judgment
The interplay between requests for admission and summary judg-
ment can be devastating for the answering party. As the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin has noted:
Federal courts have considered the question of the proper inter-
play between the summary judgment statute and the request for
admission statute and have held that summary judgment based
upon a party's untimely or incomplete response to a request for
admission can be appropriate, since the party is deemed to have
in effect admitted all material facts contained therein, even
though he may have denied them in his pleadings.244
Summary judgment is a drastic remedy under such conditions, but the
mandatory language of section 804.11(2) requires such a result.24 The
admissions must, however, encompass all elements of a claim or defense
for summary judgment to be appropriate.2' Deemed admissions may
also support a default judgment, when appropriate.247 Also worth not-
ing is that a party who obtains admissions by default does not waive his
or her right to rely thereon by presenting evidence at trial that overlaps
the matters contained in the deemed admission.2"
241. MeSparran v. Hanigan, 225 F. Supp. 628, 637 (E.D. Pa. 1963) aff'd, 356 F.2d 983 (3d
Cir. 1966) (footnotes omitted).
242. Id
243. Shakman v. Democratic Org., 481 F. Supp. 1315, 1346 n.35 (N.D. fI1. 1979). This
does not mean that all admissions are admissible into evidence. Objections to the admissibil-
ity of an admission may be raised at trial. Co~ms & LErrNER, supra note 29, § 5.9.
244. Bank of TWo Rivers v. Zimmer, 112 Wis. 2d 624,630-31,334 N.W.2d 230,233 (1983).
245. Id. at 631, 334 N.W.2d at 233.
246. Grady v. Hartford Steam Boiler Insp. & Ins. Co., 265 Wis. 610, 617, 62 N.W.2d 399,
402-03 (1954).
247. Barrow v. Schott, No. 91-1340, 1993 Wis. App. LEXIS 218, at *2 (Ct. App. Mar. 2,
1993) (limited precedent opinion).
248. Richard M. Gelb, Civil Procedure-Effect of Failure of Party to Respond to Request
for Admission of Facts, 68 MAss. L. REv. 89, 90 (1983); see also Brook Village No. Assoc. v.
General Elec. Co., 686 F.2d 66, 72 (1st Cir. 1982). But see Foellmi v. Smith, 15 Wis. 2d 274,
289-90, 112 N.W.2d 712, 719-20 (1961) (requesting party waived right to claim answers to
requests were deemed admitted when requesting party failed to object to similar examination
at trial).
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B. Use at Trial
Immediately prior to the commencement of most jury trials, the
judge will read a statement of uncontroverted facts to the jury, including,
in some cases, answers to requests for admission.249 For the requesting
party, it is helpful to have this recitation of favorable facts early in the
trial, as numerous studies indicate that information which the jury hears
first creates the most substantial impact. a0 Moreover, the fact that the
statement is read by the trial judge adds even more credibility and im-
portance to the admissions. Jurors view communications from the judge
with great respect and credibility. 1 The requesting party can take ad-
vantage of this respect and believability by including key admissions in
the uncontroverted statement of facts.
The opening statement is also an effective place to reference an ad-
mission. as 2 This is true for several reasons:
First, unless there has been a ruling preventing you from referring
to each admission as an "admission," advising the jury in your
opening statement that your adversary has "admitted" to this,
that, or the other makes it appear that your adversary has con-
ceded part of its case to you. Your opponent will have a difficult
time objecting to your characterization of the admission as an
"admission," because that is exactly what it is.a 3
The second reason to use an admission in the opening statement is that it
acts as a promise to the jury that proof of some particular fact will be
forthcoming.' 4 Unlike most promises at trial, this one is sure to be kept,
adding credibility to the requesting party's case.
Answers to requests for admission may also be introduced at trial as
substantive evidence.15- Ordinarily, admissions should be offered during
the requesting party's case-in-chief. Before an admission can be ac-
cepted into evidence, however, it is subject to all pertinent objections
that may be interposed at trial. a6 Indeed, courts have ordered answer-
ing parties to answer requests seeking inadmissible evidence with the
understanding that such answers would not be admissible at trial .2 7
249. KAPLAN, supra note 56, § 17.25, at 391.
250. It&
251. It at 392.
252. ItM
253. Id. Any attempt to object while your opening statement is proceeding would proba-
bly result in embarrassment to your adversary. Id.
254. it
255. FED. R. Evn. 801(d)(2); see Wis. STAT. § 908.01(4)(b) (1993-94).
256. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, § 2264, at 571.
257. Winchester v. Padgett, 167 F. Supp. 444, 448 (N.D. Ga. 1952).
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Admissions also make effective impeachment tools on cross-exami-
nation since they can be used in the same manner as other prior inconsis-
tent statements.258 In addition, admissions can be used during closing
argument to remind the jury that the requesting party was faithful to its
promise regarding proof of the admission. This adds significant credibil-
ity to the requesting party's overall case.259
C. Use in Other Proceedings
Any admission made by a party under section 804.11 is for the pur-
pose of the pending action only and is not an admission for any other
purpose, nor may it be used against the party in any other proceeding. 60
This rule prevents the use of admissions in other civil cases, as well as
criminal or administrative proceedings2 61 It also prevents the use of a
judgment based solely on an admission, as opposed to the admission it-
self, in a later proceeding.262
A few questions remain open, however. First, can an admission in
one proceeding be used to impeach the trial testimony of the answering
party in another action?263 Read literally, section 804.11(2) would seem
to prevent such use, but the outcome is uncertain. Second, if the plaintiff
makes an admission while the action is pending in state court and the
action is later removed to federal court, can the admission be used in the
later proceeding? What about cases that are consolidated, bifurcated, or
dismissed subject to refiling in another jurisdiction? Can a denial, as
opposed to an admission, be used in subsequent proceedings? Section
804.01(2) merely provides that "any admission" made by a party cannot
be used in other proceedings; it is silent on denials.2 64 While section
258. KAPLAN, supra note 56, § 17.25, at 392.
259. ld. at 393.
260. Wis. STAT. § 804.11(2) (1993-94).
261. See, e.g., Seay v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 360 F. Supp. 123, 124 (C.D. Cal.
1973); Weis-Fricker Export & Import Corp. v. Hartford Accid. & Indem. Co., 143 F. Supp.
137, 139 (D. Fla. 1956) (applying the rule to interrogatories).
262. In re Cassidy, 892 F.2d 637, 640 n.1 (7th Cir. 1990) [(tax court judgment based solely
on admissions cannot be used to estop relitigation of a factual question in a later proceeding),
cert. denied], 498 U.S. 812 (1990).
263. CORRIS & LEUNER, supra note 29, § 5.9. For example, assume that a number of
different lawsuits have been filed arising out of the same alleged wrongful conduct.... If
plaintiff A serves a request that the defendant admits, and in a separate lawsuit plaintiff B
serves the identical request that the defendant denies, may plaintiff B impeach the defendant
by using the defendant's response to plaintiff A's request? lId
264. See generally DoMBROFs, supra note 91, at 267-69 (discussing the availability of a
denial in subsequent appeals).
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804.11(2)'s prohibition against use in other proceedings seems iron-clad,
there are many unanswered questions.
Another question that has been raised is whether an admission of
one defendant (or plaintiff) may be used against another defendant (or
plaintiff) in the same action. Assume a lawsuit in which the plaintiff sues
both the manufacturer and the installer of a machine. In the complaint,
the plaintiff alleges that the installer negligently installed the machine
and the manufacturer negligently built the machine. Plaintiff serves a
request for admission on the manufacturer asking it to admit that the
installation was performed in a negligent manner. The manufacturer ad-
mits the request. Can the admission be used against the installer? The
answer apparently is no.265
VI. WITHDRAWAL OR AMENDMENT OF ADMISSIONS
"Any matter admitted under... [section 804.11] is conclusively es-
tablished unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment
of the admission. ' 266 The standard to be applied by the court in deter-
mining whether to allow the answering party to withdraw or amend an
answer to a request for admission varies depending on the timing of the
motion. Regardless of the standard applied, courts should be cautious in
permitting the withdrawal or amendment of admissions. 67 It is not nec-
essary for a party seeking withdrawal or amendment of an admission to
bring a formal motion in every case.268 It is within the trial court's dis-
cretion whether to permit withdrawal or amendment of the admission,
regardless of whether a formal motion has been filed.269
If the motion is asserted before the pre-trial order is entered, the
court may permit withdrawal or amendment (1) when the presentation
of the merits of the action will be subserved by the withdrawal or
amendment and (2) the requesting party fails to satisfy the court that
withdrawal or amendment will prejudice him or her in maintaining the
action or defense on the merits.2 70 The decision to allow relief from the
effect of an admission is discretionary,271 requiring the court to balance
the answering party's right to a full trial on the merits against the re-
265. See generally KAPLAN, supra note 56, § 17.06, at 371.
266. Wis. STAT. § 804.11(2) (1993-94).
267. WluGnrr & M.LER, supra note 13, § 2264, at 578.
268. Schmid v. Olsen, 111 Wis. 2d 228, 235 n.3, 330 N.W.2d 547, 551 n.3 (1983).
269. Demos v. Giller, No. 87-0511, 1988 Wisc. App. LEXIS 50, at *8-9 (Ct. App. 1988)
(limited precedent opinion).
270. Id at *9-10.
271. Schmid, 111 Wis. 2d at 237, 330 N.W.2d at 511.
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questing party's justifiable reliance on pretrial procedure.272 The discre-
tion, however, must be exercised consistent with the two-prong test set
forth in section 804.11(2).
The burden of proof in this situation is split between the parties. The
answering party, who filed the motion to withdraw or amend, must es-
tablish that upholding the admission would effectively eliminate any
presentation of the merits of the case at trial.273 If an admission is dis-
positive of the case, the court is more inclined to allow withdrawal or
amendment because a failure to do so would amount to a complete ad-
mission of liability thereby preventing a trial on the merits.274 Allowing
an admission on the key factual issue in the case would practically elimi-
nate any presentation of the merits.275 In Schmid v. Olsen,2 76 the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin noted that if it allowed the admission of an
ultimate fact to stand, a trial on the merits would be unnecessary. Ac-
cordingly, the court remanded the case to the trial court to determine
whether withdrawal should be permitted.277 Federal courts, notably,
have rejected a per se rule permitting withdrawal of any admission that
relates to a key issue in the litigation, requiring the answering party to
come forward with some additional evidence.278
The second prong of the test requires the requesting party to prove
that he or she will be prejudiced if the court permits withdrawal or
amendment of the admission.279 Prejudice means the difficulty a party
may have in proving its case because of the sudden need to obtain evi-
dence supporting the matter previously admitted.28 0 Prejudice stems
from the requesting party's reliance on the binding effect of the admis-
sion."8 For example, a party is prejudiced when trial is imminent and
the party has, in reliance on its opponent's admissions, forgone discovery
that would have explored the fact established by the admissions. 282 Any
adverse effect on the requesting party's general preparation for trial
272. Kenney, supra note 1, at 14.
273. Id
274. Id.
275. Westmoreland v. Triumph Motorcycle Corp., 71 F.R.D. 192, 193 (D. Conn. 1976).
276. 111 Wis. 2d 228, 330 N.W.2d 547 (1983).
277. Id. at 239, 330 N.W.2d at 553.
278. Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Deutz-Allis Corp., 120 F.R.D. 655, 660 (E.D.N.C.
1988); CoRgis & LEITNER, supra note 29, at § 5.23.
279. Wis. STAT. § 804.11(2) (1993-94).
280. GaEiG & HARvEY, supra note 48, § 411.5, at 574.
281. WRGHir & MI=LR, supra note 13, § 2264, at 577.
282. CORRIS & LErrNER, supra note 29, § 5.23.
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caused by the withdrawal may constitute prejudice.z 3 Prejudice is more
likely to exist when the answering party seeks to withdraw an admission
late in the trial process.' The fact that the answering party's position
could have been extrapolated from the pleadings and answers to inter-
rogatories does not mitigate the prejudice. The courts have applied a
somewhat liberal standard in determining the existence of prejudice.2. 5
Prejudice means more than an adverse effect on the requesting
party's case, as withdrawal or amendment will almost certainly prejudice
the requesting party's case; otherwise, the requesting party would not
contest the motion. Prejudice has been found when the withdrawal or
amendment will require a delay of the trial or additional discovery 86 It
has also been found where the withdrawal would require the requesting
party to undertake a lengthy, laborious and costly search for additional
evidence.'
There seems to be some confusion regarding the appropriate stan-
dard to apply in determining whether to allow an admission to be with-
drawn or amended. As shown above, section 804.11 specifically sets
forth a two-prong test for withdrawal. This test focuses on two items:
the effect the admission will have on a decision on the merits and the
prejudice to the requesting party if the admission is withdrawn. Never-
theless, a couple of Wisconsin decisions have utilized the "excusable ne-
glect" standard of section 801.15 in deciding whether to permit a late
answer to requests for admission3m Unlike section 804.11, section
801.15 focuses on the answering party's reason for the late filing. The
decisions utilizing the excusable neglect standard with respect to re-
quests for admission would appear to be erroneous.
After the pretrial conference has taken place, the standard that the
court must apply in determining whether to permit withdrawal or
amendment of an admission is different. The court's authority to permit
withdrawal or amendment of an admission is subject to section 802.11,289
283. Gnn mG & HARvEY, supra note 48, § 411.5, at 574.
284. CoRMis & LIrrNER, supra note 29, § 5.23.
285. Kenney, supra note 1, at 14.
286. E.E.O.C. v. Jordan Graphics, Inc., 135 F.R.D. 126, 129 (W.D.N.C. 1991).
287. Weva Oil Corp. v. Belco Petro. Corp., 68 F.R.D. 663, 666-67 (N.D. W. Va. 1975).
288. Wis. Stat. § 801.15(2)(a) (1993-94) provides that "[i]f a motion is made after the expi-
ration of the specified time, it shall not be granted unless the court finds that the failure to act
was the result of excusable neglect."
289. Wis. Stat. § 802.11(4) (1993-94) provides:
The judge shall make an order which recites the action taken with respect to the mat-
ters described in [section 802.11(1)] and which sets forth or confirms the final trial date.
The order when entered shall control the subsequent course of action, unless modified
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which governs the amendment of pretrial orders.2 90 Under section
802.11, a pretrial order or scheduling order may be amended only upon a
showing of "good cause." It is unclear how the "good cause" standard
differs from the two-prong test enunciated in section 804.11.291 One
commentator suggests that there is no practical difference between the
two standards.29 There is no Wisconsin authority on this point.
VII. EXPENSES FOR FAILURE TO ADMIT
The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin recently declared that "[i]n the
face of increasingly complex and expensive litigation, discovery plays a
vital role in issue formulation and limitation. As the role of discovery
increases in importance, the need for effective sanctions against those
who abuse the discovery process becomes greater. ' 293 Not coinciden-
tally, there are several sanctions associated with requests for admission.
First, failure to submit a timely response results automatically in a
deemed admission.294 Second, if the court on motion determines that a
denial is insufficient, the court may deem the request admitted or order
that an amended answer be served. In either event, the court may award
the winning party expenses.295
Third, section 804.12(3) provides for cost-of-proof sanctions against a
party who refuses to admit a matter that is subsequently proven true.2 9 6
If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of
any matter set forth in a request for admission,297 and if the party re-
questing the admission thereafter proves the genuineness of the docu-
thereafter on motion of a party or the court for good cause. If for any reason, the
action is not tried on the date set in the scheduling order or the pretrial order, the judge
shall, within 30 days after the date set in the scheduling order or pretrial order, set
another date for trial on the earliest available trial date.
290. Id § 804.11(2).
291. Withdrawal or amendment of admissions under FRCP 36 is subject to FRCP 16,
which allows amendments to the pretrial order only to prevent "manifest injustice." FED. R.
Civ. P. 16(e). Federal courts are split concerning the appropriate standard to apply when
determining whether to allow withdrawal of an admission after the start of trial. Compare
Farr Man & Co. v. M/V Rozita, 903 F.2d 871, 876 (1st Cir. 1990) (applying manifest injustice
standard) with Eckell v. Borbidge, 114 B.R. 63, 66 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (manifest injustice standard
applies only if admission was incorporated in pretrial order).
292. CORRIS & LEITNER, supra note 29, § 5.23.
293. Michael A.P. v. Solsrud, 178 Wis. 2d 137, 156, 502 N.W.2d 918, 926 (Ct. App. 1993),
review denied, 179 Wis. 2d clxxxvii, 508 N.W.2d 422 (Wis. 1993).
294. Wis. STAT. § 804.11(1)(b) (1993-94).
295. Id § 804.11(1)(c).
296. See generally CoRms & LErrNER, supra note 29, § 5.24.
297. The requesting party has the initial burden of proving that the requests were prop-
erly served on the answering party. Michael A.P., 178 Wis. 2d at 148, 502 N.W.2d at 922.
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ment or the truth of the matter, the requesting party may apply to the
court for an order requiring the answering party to pay the requesting
party the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred in the
making of that proof.2 98 Section 804.12(3) applies only in cases where
the answering party denied the requests for admission or stated an in-
ability to admit or deny. It does not apply to cases where the answering
party failed to respond to a request for admission since this is deemed
simply to be an admission.299
The award of fees under section 804.12(3) is mandatory, ° ° unless the
court finds that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant to sec-
tion 804.11(1)(c); (2) the admission sought was of no substantial impor-
tance; (3) the answering party had reasonable ground to believe that he
or she might prevail on the matter; or (4) there was other good reason
for the failure to admit.3"1 The party refuses to admit acts at its own
peril, as section 804.12(3) mandates fees unless one of the four enumer-
ated exceptions applies. 3"
The first exception-that the request was objectionable-is self-ex-
planatory. If an objection was sustained, then no consequences can arise
from the failure to admit.30 3 If an objection is unfounded, the requesting
party must move the court for a determination of sufficiency prior to
trial.304
The second exception-that the admission is of no substantial impor-
tance-is patently ambiguous, but seems to indicate that expenses will
not be awarded if the time and effort to prove the matter involved in the
request was trivial.305 Professor Finman, on the other hand, has declared
that the availability of sanctions should not depend on the effort in-
volved in proving the admission.30 6
The third exception-that the answering party had reasonable
grounds to believe that he or she might prevail on the matter-is the
most important of the exceptions. The question in this exception is not
whether the answering party prevailed at trial, but whether the answer-
ing party reasonably believed that he or she might prevail.30 7 This ex-
298. Wis. STAT. § 804.12(3) (1993-94).
299. GiRENG & HARVEY, supra note 48, § 412.4, at 587.
300. Michael A.P., 178 Wis. 2d at 154, 502 N.W.2d at 925.
301. Wis. STAT. § 804.12(3) (1993-94).
302. Comus & LETnER, supra note 29, § 5.24.
303. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, § 2290, at 710.
304. See Wis. STAT. § 804.11(1)(c) (1993-94).
305. WRIGHT & MIR, supra note 13, § 2290, at 710.
306. Finman, supra note 10, at 430.
307. WRIGHT & MLLR, supra note 13, § 2290, at 711-12.
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ception protects the party's right to a day in court.30 8 The burden of
proving this exception is easier to meet if the request for admission deals
with the ultimate issue in the case.30 9
The fourth exception-other good cause for the failure to admit-is
undefined and thus left to the court's discretion. Other good cause
would exist, for example, if the answering party did not have, and could
not obtain by reasonable inquiry, information on whether the matter
contained in the request was true. Other good cause would also exist
if the request required the answering party go beyond a "reasonable in-
quiry" to determine the truth of the matter requested. 1'
Section 804.12(3) encourages litigants to take seriously the issue-nar-
rowing purpose of requests for admission.31 2 If requests for admission
are to be taken seriously, courts must not be reluctant to award such
expenses. Section 804.12(3) specifically authorizes an award of expenses
only against a party; it does not authorize an award of expenses against
counsel.313 The expenses that can be assessed are only those that could
have been avoided by the admission and do not include expenses in-
curred prior to the filing of the answers to the requests for admission. 4
This includes time spent during trial to prove the matters at issue in the
requests for admission, as well as time spent preparing for the trial with
respect to such issues.3 15 In Mooney v. Royal Ins. Co,3 16 the court of
appeals upheld an award of $1240 in section 804.12(3) sanctions, which
represented one day of trial time and four hours of preparation time
relating to matters dealt with in the requests for admission. Moreover,
in Michael A.P. v. Solsrud, 17 the court of appeals affirmed a section
804.12(3) award of more than $78,000 for the answering party's unrea-
308. CORRIS & LEITNER, supra note 29, § 5.24.
309. lIt
310. WRIGi-rr & MILLER, supra note 13, § 2290, at 712.
311. See Martin v. Mabus, 734 F. Supp. 1216, 1224 (S.D. Miss. 1990).
312. CORRIS & LErINER, supra note 29, § 5.24.
313. GRENIG & HARVEY, supra note 48, § 412.4, at 587.
314. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, § 2290, at 710.
315. Michael A.P. v. Solsrud, 178 Wis. 2d 137, 154-55, 502 N.W.2d 918, 925 (Ct. App.
1993), review denied, 179 Wis. 2d at clxxxvii, 508 N.W.2d 422 (1993). The award may include
expenses for trial preparation time, time spent listening to information revealed by other
counsel that may affect those issues, listening to opening and closing statements to learn the
strategy of other counsel and how that strategy may affect those issues, and attending confer-
ences at which instructions and verdict questions that go to the heart of the jury's resolution of
those issues are discussed. Id.
316. 164 Wis. 2d 516, 524-26, 476 N.W.2d 287, 290-91 (Ct. App. 1991).
317. 178 Wis. 2d 137, 156,502 N.W.2d 918, 926 (Ct. App. 1993), review denied, 179 Wis.2d
clxxxvii, 508 N.W.2d 422 (1993).
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sonable denial of an entire set of requests for admission. These recent
decisions indicate Wisconsin courts will not hesitate to award section
804.12(3) expenses.
VIII. REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION AND PRETRIAL CONFERENCES
Pretrial conferences are designed to require the court to exert greater
control over the course of litigation, particularly the course of discov-
ery.3 18 Once the pretrial order is entered by the court, it dictates the
further contours of the trial.319 One of the purposes of the pretrial con-
ference is to define and simplify the issues and to eliminate issues not in
dispute. 20 Matters that have been stipulated to and are contained in the
pretrial order need not be proven at trial.32 ' Requests for admission
have the potential to facilitate the stipulation process.32 According to
one authority:
It is the combination of the exchange of requests addressed to
issue reduction and formulation within the conference setting that
yields the promise of the new approach. An exchange of requests
for admission prior to the discovery conference will enable the
court to know the positions of the opposing parties. If more time
is needed to conduct a bona fide "reasonable inquiry," periodic
discovery conferences and successive requests for admission may
be used.323
The effectiveness of requests for admission is greatly enhanced in the
pretrial conference context by use of interrogatories, which probe the
basis for the denial of any request for admission.3 4 If used correctly, the
combination of requests for admissions, interrogatories and pretrial con-
ferences have the potential to expedite civil litigation.3 2
318. Report on Practice Under Rule 36, supra note 31, at 43. Wis. STAT. § 802.11(1)
(1993-94) provides, in pertinent part:
In all contested civil actions... the judge shall.., direct the attorneys for the parties to
appear before the judge for a pretrial conference to determine whether an order should
be entered on any or all of the following matters:
(a) Definition and simplification of the issues of fact and law;
(b) Necessity or desirability of amendment to the pleadings;
(c) Stipulations of fact and agreements concerning the identity of or authenticity of
documents which will avoid unnecessary proof ....
319. DomBRoE, supra note 91, at 276.
320. See Wis. STAT. § 802.11(1) (1993-94).
321. DOlvmROFF, supra note 91, at 276.
322. Report on Practice Under Rule 36, supra note 31, at 43.
323. Evans, supra note 32, at 486.
324. Report on Practice Under Rule 36, supra note 31, at 44. For examples of such inter-
rogatories, see supra section Il.B.2.
325. Report on Practice Under Rule 36, supra note 31, at 44.
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There are a few alternatives to requests for admission.3 26 First, the
parties can stipulate to agreed facts, either as an independent agreement
or as part of the pretrial order.3 27 Wisconsin courts have recognized that
requests for admission are, in effect, stipulations of fact.3" The problem
with stipulations is, of course, that there are no sanctions available to
coerce recalcitrant parties to agree to facts.329 Another alternative is an
agreed statement of facts, which could be part of either a trial brief or a
motion for summary judgment.3 The latter procedure is described as
follows:
Counsel for one side, typically the plaintiff, are ordered by the
court to draft a series of numbered, narrative statements of objec-
tive facts which they believe can be established, avoiding to the
extent possible all argumentative language, labels, and legal con-
clusions. Opposing counsel must then indicate which of the pro-
posed facts are admitted (or will not be contested) and which are
disputed, specifying the nature of the disagreement by appropri-
ate interlineation or deletion, as well as drafting narrative state-
ments of additional facts that they believe can be established.
The newly added statements are then returned to the first party
for admission (or non-contradiction) or for specific disagreement.
A consolidated statement reflecting what is agreed and what re-
mains in dispute is then filed with the court as a stipulation of the
parties.33'
Like stipulations, agreed statements of fact lack adequate enforcement
mechanisms.332
IX. LAWYERS BEWARE
Requests for admission expose the answering party's attorney to
more discipline and malpractice liability than any other discovery de-
vice.333 Requests for admission have been referred to as "a ticking time
326. At least one Wisconsin court has held that a motion to dismiss is not to be used as a
substitute for requests for admission. See Boek v. Wagner, 1 Wis. 2d 337, 343, 83 N.W.2d 916,
919 (1957).
327. Wis. STAT. § 802.11(1)(c) (1993-94).
328. Employers Ins. v. Mitchell, No. 82-2262, (Wis. Ct. App. June 20, 1983) (LEXIS,
States library, Wisc file) (limited precedent opinion).
329. See generally YOUNG & ZALL, supra note 85, § 7.28 (observing that stipulations are
useful when used early).
330. See generally TED M. WARSHAFSKY, TRiAL HANDBOOK FOR WISCONsIN LAWYERS
§ 122, at 179-82 (1981) (discussing other alternatives).
331. MANUAL FOR CowX LITIGATION, § 21.47, at 79-80 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
332. See Report on Practice Under Rule 36, supra note 31, at 46-47.
333. See Schumm, supra note 195, at 339.
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bomb which has brought grief to many a lawyer and his client because of
failure to understand the statutory purpose, method and effect. ' '3 4 This
grief can occur at various stages in the litigation. For instance, if an at-
torney submits an improper denial on behalf of the answering party, his
or her client may be ordered to pay the requesting party's expenses, in-
cluding attorney's fees, incurred in a hearing to determine the sufficiency
of the denial. The same holds true if the answering party's attorney sub-
mits an objection that is later found insufficient. Section 804.11(1)(c)
permits the court to award such expenses only against the answering
party, and not against his or her attorney.33 5 But rest assured, many cli-
ents will look to the attorney for reimbursement, assuming the attorney
was at fault in drafting the improper answer or objection.
Another means of exposure is the cost-of-proof provisions in section
804.12(3). That section, like section 804.11(1)(c), permits the court to
award expenses, including attorney's fees, only against the answering
party, and not against his or her attorney.33 6 In Michael A.P. v. Sol-
srud,337 the court ordered the answering party to pay more than $78,000
to the requesting party. One would suspect that this award adversely
affected the answering party's relationship with his attorney, possibly ex-
posing the attorney to professional discipline and malpractice liability.
The primary means of disciplinary and malpractice exposure, how-
ever, arises when the answering party's attorney fails to respond in a
timely and proper fashion to the requests for admission, resulting in the
deemed admission of the requests.33 If the requests were directed at the
ultimate issues in the litigation, the deemed admissions may be used as
the basis for summary judgment in favor of the requesting party.339 Con-
sequently, a late or improper response to a request for admission has the
potential to end the litigationY40 Such a response also has the potential
to expose the answering party's attorney to malpractice liability, profes-
sional discipline and court-ordered sanctions. Most attorneys seem una-
ware of the potential for such exposure. This may be due in part to the
fact that such exposure is a relatively recent phenomenon.
334. Shirley Engel, Requests for Admission-A Discovery Trap A Review of California
Code of Civil Procedure 2033, 18 U. WEST L.A. L. REv. 61, 61 (1986).
335. See Wis. STAT. § 804.11(1)(c) (1993-94).
336. Id § 804.12(3).
337. Michael A.P., 178 Wis. 2d at 156, 502 N.W.2d at 926.
338. The same exposure would exist for an attorney who improperly admits a request
without his or her client's consent.
339. See e.g., Schmid v. Olsen, 111 Wis. 2d 228, 236, 330 N.W.2d 547, 551 (1983).
340. Id.
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A. Malpractice
An attorney who is unfamiliar with requests for admission may sub-
ject a client to a motion for summary judgment by unintentionally con-
ceding all issues in the case.341 The malpractice exposure from such
conduct should be readily apparent.' 2 For example, in In re PCX
Corp.,34 3 a client asserted a malpractice action against its former attor-
neys, who had represented the client in a contract action. The attorneys
had failed to respond to a set of requests for admission in the contract
action.3 1 The client claimed that the failure to respond to the requests
for admission-which resulted in all of the facts being deemed admitted
for the purpose of summary judgment-was per se legal malpractice.
The court disagreed, but noted that the "failure to respond to the Re-
quest to Admit is compelling evidence of negligence.... "I Similarly,
in Macawber Engineering, Inc. v. Robson & Miller,' a client filed a
legal malpractice action against the firm that had acted as its local de-
fense counsel in a warranty action. The plaintiff served requests for ad-
mission on both local counsel and out-of-state counsel. Neither counsel
responded. As a result, judgment was entered for the plaintiff in the
amount of $650,000.341 In the malpractice action, the client claimed that
local counsel's failure to respond to the requests for admission consti-
tuted legal malpractice. The Eighth Circuit disagreed. Without address-
ing whether the failure to respond constituted negligence, the court
ruled that the attorneys, as local counsel, owed no duty to ensure the
filing of discovery answers.348 Although the clients in these two cases
lost on technicalities, it is a safe bet that many more legal malpractice
actions will be asserted in the coming decades, as lawyers continue to
misconceive the nature and purpose of requests for admission.
341. Schumm, supra note 195, at 339.
342. Id.
343. No. 94 C 2309, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17778, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 8, 1994).
344. Id at *2; see generally Engel, supra note 334, at 63-74.
345. In re PCX Corp., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *7. The court found that, under Illinois
law, the failure to respond to the requests, by itself, is insufficient to establish legal malprac-
tice. The client must show that it would have been successful in the contract action even had
the requests been handled properly. Id.
346. No. 94-2003, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1751, at *1 (8th Cir. Jan. 31, 1995).
347. Id.
348. Id. at *12.
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B. Discipline
The failure of an attorney to respond in a timely fashion to requests
for admission has also resulted in professional discipline. In Porter v.
State Bar,349 an attorney was suspended from practice for two years for,
inter alia, failing to respond to a series of requests for admission. The
attorney's failure to respond to the requests resulted in a default judg-
ment being entered against his client. Similarly, in In re Riddle,350 an
attorney was suspended from practice for eighteen months for failing to
respond to requests for admission. The attorney's malfeasance resulted
in a summary judgment being entered against his client.351 The court
concluded that the lawyer had violated Arizona's version of Model
Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1, 1.3 and 1.4352 in his representation of
the client. 53 The court gave the following explanation of its decision to
suspend the attorney:
The goal of lawyer discipline is not to punish the lawyer but to
deter similar conduct by other lawyers. Other lawyers and the
public need to know that failure to pursue a client's case and fail-
ure to inform a client of the outcome of a case will not be toler-
ated. The Commission believes a suspension of eighteen months
will satisfy the goal of lawyer discipline. 4
This is a hefty price to pay for what must have seemed like a trivial
discovery matter. Simply put, much can be learned from Riddle's
mistake.
C. Sanctions
Section 804.12(3) is not the exclusive remedy for untrue answers to
requests for admission. Federal courts have held that the filing of an-
349. 801 P.2d 1135, 1136 (Cal. 1990).
350. 857 P.2d 1233, 1234 (Ariz. 1993).
351. Id.
352. Wisconsin's version of these rules provides:
S.C.R. 20:1.1. Competence. A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a cli-
ent. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. S.C.R. 20:1.3. Diligence. A
lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.
S.C.R. 20:1.4. Communication. (a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed
about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for
information.
Wis. S. Cr. R. 20:1.1, 20:13, 20:1.4(a).
353. In re Riddle, 857 P.2d at 1235.
354. Id. at 1236 (citations omitted).
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swers to requests for admission is governed by FRCP 11,111 the federal
counterpart to section 802.05 of the Wisconsin Statutes. 6 FRCP 11 pro-
vides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he signature of an attorney or party con-
stitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer had read the pleading,
motion or other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, infor-
mation, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in
fact . . . .357 Courts have determined that an answer to a request for
admission is a "pleading, motion or other paper" and, as such, is in-
cluded within the scope of FRCP 11.358 Consequently, a false answer to
a request for admission would not be "well grounded in fact" if the
signer knew or should have known of its falsity.359 According to FRCP
11:
If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this
rule, the court, upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the per-
son who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate
sanction, which may include an order to pay the other party or
parties the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of
the pleading, motion or other paper, including reasonable attor-
ney's fees.36 °
Unlike section 804.12(3), section 802.05-Wisconsin's counterpart to
FRCP 11-authorizes the court to impose sanctions on the answering
party and his or her attorney.361
355. See, e.g., Herrara v. Scully, 143 F.R.D. 545, 552-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). The 1993
amendments to FRCP 11, however, make clear that it is not to be used as a method for ob-
taining sanctions against a party who prepares a frivolous or bad faith response to requests for
admission. According to the 1993 amendment, sanctions with respect to FRCP 36 are to be
handled under the discovery sanction provisions of FRCP 37. FED. R. Civ. P. 36(a). But note
that no corresponding amendments have been made to section 802.05 of the Wisconsin
Statutes.
356. Wis. STAT. § 802.05(1) (1993-94), which provides in pertinent part:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party
has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of the attorney's or
party's knowledge, information and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, the plead-
ing, motion or other paper is well-grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law; and that
the pleading, motion or other paper is not used for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
357. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
358. Section 802.05(1) of the Wisconsin Statutes contains the same language as FRCP 11.
359. A & V Fishing, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 145 F.R.D. 285, 287 (D. Mass. 1993) (quoting
FED. R. Civ. P. 11).
360. FED. R. Crv. P. 11. Section 802.05(1) of the Wisconsin Statutes is substantively iden-
tical to FRCP 11.
361. See generally A & V Fishing, Inc., 145 F.R.D. at 287 (comparing Rule 11 and 37
sanctions).
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Attorneys may also be subject to sanctions under section
804.12(2)(b) of the Wisconsin Statutes.362 If an order has been entered
by the court requiring the answering party to serve an answer or to serve
an amended answer and he or she refuses to do so, the court has author-
ity to sanction the answering party and his or her attorney.363 Possible
sanctions include the foreclosure of certain evidence at trial or a con-
tempt of court finding for failure to obey a court order.3 4
X. CONCLUSION
For Wisconsin practitioners, requests for admission can be either
feast or famine. On the one hand, the attorney requesting the admis-
sions can use them to save a client considerable time and expense by
eliminating or narrowing the issues involved in the dispute. Moreover,
skillful use of requests for admission may result in an outright victory for
the client or, at the very least, may give the client the upper-hand at trial.
The attorney answering the requests for admission, on the other hand,
faces virtual ruin if he or she is unfamiliar with the discovery device.365
An untimely or ill-prepared answer may cause final judgment to be en-
tered against a client. It may also expose the client to pecuniary or evi-
dentiary sanctions. This, in turn, may expose the attorney to malpractice
liability, professional discipline or court-ordered sanctions.
The purpose of this Article was to provide the information necessary
to guide Wisconsin attorneys through the law of admissions. While it has
demonstrated the enormous potential of requests for admission, it has
also warned attorneys of the hazards associated with such a potent dis-
covery device. All things considered, however, requests for admission
are a form of discovery that should be praised, not disparaged. Wiscon-
sin attorneys are, therefore, encouraged to use requests for admission
early and often in all types of civil litigation, and judges are encouraged
to strictly enforce the sanctioning provisions of the rule. Proper applica-
tion and enforcement of the rules will significantly reduce judicial delay
and litigation expenses.366
362. Wis. STAT. § 804.12(2)(b) (1993-94).
363. See Kenney, supra note 1, at 17.
364. Id
365. Id
366. See generally YOUNG & ZALL, supra note 85, § 7.25 ("Unless the court takes an
active role in promoting stipulations and the fair admission of facts, these tools are rarely
useful in eliminating [other] methods of discovery.").
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